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History

“To Make A Garden Spot of One o f the Dreariest Places on the Planet”: Federal
Reclamation on the Zuni and Navajo Reservations, 1883-1914 (121 pp.)
Director: Dan L. Flores

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the power of irrigation to redeem
the arid portions o f the American West and make it habitable and productive country
became akin to gospel. As the gospel o f irrigation caught on, the Indian Service began to
see the possibilities that reclamation held for not only redeeming barren land, but for
modernizing Indians. The Navajo and Zuni Indians were two o f the first peoples to be
subject to the Indian Service's plans to turn the desert into a garden. Between 1883 and
1914 the Indian Service tried time and again to make irrigation work. In the last fifteen
years o f the nineteenth century efforts at irrigation were amateurish, ad hoc affairs. But
after the turn o f the century, the Indian Service got serious. The Blackrock dam on the
Zuni reservation came to dominate irrigation efforts in the Southwest: The fifteen years
on either side of the new century were markedly different. Drought plagued the
Southwest in the late nineteenth century, and wet years characterized the first decade and
a half of the twentieth. The change in the climate paralleled perfectly the change 0‘om
amateurism to professionalism in the Indian Service's irrigation efforts. Drought lulled
the Indian Service into thinking that it could control Southwestern streams. But the
increase in rainfall and streamflow in the twentieth century saw to it that their
waterworks projects continually were damaged. I explore the change in policy from
small projects to large ones and the effect the change in the climate had on those projects
and Indian Service policy.
As important as tlie change in the weather was to rendering the waterworks projects
useless was Indian resistance. Each year was marked by cycles of ritual, as well as
hunting and agricultural regimes. The Navajo and Zuni allegiance to their annudl cycles,
when combined with the change in the weather, saw to it that the projects would never be
successful. Adequate Zuni and Navajo labor could never be secured. Indian agency in
determining their own history is a major feature of the thesis. The Indian Service failed
to take into account both the environment and Indians in designing their agricultural
utopia. Both saw to it that their plans were unsuccessful.
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Reclamation and Redemption: Indians, the Indian Service, and the Gospel of
Irrigation

Each year as the snow in the mountains o f the Colorado Plateau melts, donnant
arroyos and tiny washes awake from hibernation and for a short time they water the
desert floor. Again in the summer, when the monsoon season hits the country, after a
brief rest, these same stream beds are called to action. The combined power o f wind and
water forms the region’s unique topography.' Bift the floods that wash over northern
Arizona and New Mexico each year have eroded and reshaped more than the physical
landscape. They washed away great plans to transform the desert into a garden.
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian policy, in part, was patterned
around turning Indians into self supporting communities. Virtually all the western Indian
peoples endured the same process; sedentary farming would end what appeared to be
nomadic ways, and, along with the Dawes Allotment Act, free up valuable land for white
settlers. Indians would come to value private property and embrace the market economy,
too.^ But across the West, one last act o f benevolent paternalism was necessary: the
construction of irrigation projects. In 1898, N.S. Walpole, the agent for the Pueblo and
Jicarilla Agency in New Mexico, optimistically declared that a dam on the Zuni
* For the boundaries o f the Southwest and geologic history see Donald Baars, Navajo Country: A Geology
and Natural H istory o f the Four Com ers Region (Albuquerque; Univ. o f N ew M exico Press, 1995); for a
lengthy discussion o f the boundaries o f the Southwest, see James W. Byrkit, “Land, Sky, and People: The
Southwest Defined,” Journal o f the Southwest 34 (1992): 257-387, see especially 283-301
* David Rich Lewis, “Agriculture, Civilization, and American Indian Policy,” in Neither Wolf, Nor Dog:
American Indians, Environment, and Agrarian Change (N ew York. Oxford Univ. Press, 1994); R.
Douglas Hurt, “From Civû War to Severalty” and “The White M an’s Road,” in Indian Agriculture in
Am erica: From Prehistory to the Present (Lawrence: The Univ. Press o f Kansas, 1987); Donald J. Pisani,
Chapter 8, “Case Studies in National Water Policy: The Yakima and the Pima,” in Nationalizing the Waters
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reservation would forever obviate the need for Government assistance and “they would
have thousands of bushels of grain for market and thus live decently

Walpole’s

enthusiasm was echoed across other reservations; Irrigation projects would redeem
Indians and make them better prepared for the rigors o f the twentieth century.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Indian Service crisscrossed
the Southwest designing irrigation projects for needy Indians.^

Largely spawned by

benevolent intents, the projects were nevertheless plagued by a variety of problems. In
the three and a half decades I will examine, the Indian Service attempted to build several
projects for the Navajo and Zuni Indians. On the Navajo reservation, the Indian Service
planned both large and small waterworks projects; at Zuni, one major dam was to suffice
for all of their water needs.
The history of irrigation development on the Colorado Plateau between 18801915 falls into two distinct phases. They break at roughly the turn of the century. In the
first phase, Indian Agents were just beginning to get to know the country. In fact, the
Pueblo Agent administered the Zunis; they did not have their own Agent until 1902.
Indian Agents—many of whom in the nineteenth century were patronage appointments—
had little or no experience with anything resembling engineering, much less Indians, but
they tried their hand at reclaiming Southwestern waterways for the benefit of Indian
peoples. The Agents were naïve, but generally had good intentions. Too, an almost

(forthcoming); Thomas R. W essel, “Agriculture, Indians, and American History Agricultural H istory 50
(1976): 9-20; the Zuni, Navajo, and Pueblo lands were not allotted under the D aw es Act.
^ N .S. Walpole to Comm, o f Indian Affairs (CIA), 22 November 1898, Special Case 190-Irrigation (SC
190), B ox 212, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D C. (N A ). I will cite the letter
number when one is provided.
“ There were irrigation projects attempted all over the Southwest, not only on the Colorado Plateau.
Indeed, all over the W est, the Indian Service worked to reclaim river and streams for Indians.
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biannual turnover of Agents made it tough for any one Agent to get to know the country.
As each Agent cycled through the reservations he would have to learn anew the
exigencies of desert living/
From the first, reclaiming water was associated with redeeming Indians.

A

permanent water supply would finally plant the Navajo, for example, in one place.
Because white settlers were moving into the region, Navajos could not continue to
wander the country in search o f water. At Zuni, Agents found sedentary agriculturists.
They had settled along the Zuni River and near several springs, but were not using the
water to its full potential.

If they could manage to put more land under cultivation

possibly they could grow a surplus and have enough to sell at market. At the very least,
growing more food would lift them out of their apparently destitute condition.
Putting Indians to work was another benefit of building waterworks on the
reservations. Teaching Indians the value of work was, to be sure, no less a goal than
reclamation.

Indeed, the leading conservation journal of the day. Forestry and

Irrigation, took this position. In 1903, an anonymous author wrote.
While the object is to give the Indian productive farming land, it has been the
custom, with very few exceptions, to employ him in every way possible on the work.
The idea is to give him manual training, to teach him to build and care for a ditch, to
create a market for his labor, and make him work for a daily wage, even though he be
paid to work for his own advantage. ^

When the Indian Service tried to manage water, they also tried to change Indians
into citizens of the modem world through work. Their goals were twofold: transform
^ Ruth Underhill found that between 1869 and 1902 there were fifteen different agents on the Navajo
Reservation, giving them little time to understand the yearly cycle o f floods, or much else, for that matter.
Ruth Underhill, tJie Navajo {lincoixi. Univ. o f Nebraska Press, 1956), 169
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waterways into tools o f more efficient production and change Indians into workers, and
thus model participants in the twentieth century.

That is, by reclaiming rivers and

streams they sought to redeem Indians; by putting the rivers to work they would put
Indians to work. The dam at Zuni employed almost exclusively Indian workers and was
thought of as an ideal way to train local Indians—^Navajos, Apaches, and Pueblos, as well
as Zunis—the value of a hard day’s work. The documents are rife with the rhetoric of
redemption. These were the modest designs of the Indian Service.
In this first phase Agents had little or no idea what they were doing. Harnessing
the power of southwestern streams proved more troublesome than they had envisioned.
Part of the urgency that the Agents felt was brought on by the extreme aridity of the
Colorado Plateau.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century a millennial drought

desiccated the Southwest.^

Naturally enough, agents took the drought for normal

conditions. And because they could not imagine any other weather scenario they worked
furiously to compensate for the drought by building waterworks for the Indians. That
Indian Agents with little or no experience in the desert misread the landscape and made
mistakes should come as no surprise.
But nature in the Southwest was a merciless foe for the Indian Service. When the
nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, the cycle of drought that withered the
Southwest for two decades—and left behind immense gullies and a thirsty desert— was
replaced by a series of wet years—the beginning of the second phase of irrigation
development. This climatic pulse coincided with the Indian Service’s plans to move from

^ Anonymous, “The American Indian and Irrigation,” Forestry’ and Irrigation 9 (1903): 233, Francis E,
Leupp, The Indian and His Problem
York Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1910), 157-158.
^ S ee note 9, especially Schulman.
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small reclamation projects designed to reclaim ephemeral streams and move to grand
waterworks on the Colorado Plateau.* Heavy and destructive flooding became common
after 1902, when more regular rain started to fall on the region.

And in 1905 New

Mexico experienced its wettest year to date.^ The drought fueled the fire of reclamation,
and the floods of the first decade of the new century doused it.
The two phases of irrigation development are broken by this sudden climate shift.
The level of optimism that peppers the documents in the nineteenth century is
remarkable indeed. But by the time that major rains began to return to the Colorado
Plateau, and the march of the twentieth century was well underway, attitudes, and
circumstances, had changed. Optimistic naïveté marked late nineteenth century designs,
while professional, bureaucratic concerns drove efforts in the early twentieth.
The increase in rainfall and flood severity was not the only factor that kept
irrigation projects from succeeding in the region. John B. Harper, eventually in charge of
most waterworks projects on the Colorado Plateau, was obsessed with the massive
Blackrock Dam on the Zuni reservation. In his single-minded focus to finish the dam he
neglected damage done to other projects that were also affected by the severe flooding.
Harper’s and the Indian Service’s development at Zuni led to the underdevelopment
* The Hopi, Jicarilla Apache, Utes, Pueblos and many more also had irrigation works planned and, in some
cases built, for their respective reservations.
^ For the climate changes and the Navajo see Underhill, 167; Richard White, The Roots o f Dependency:
Environment. Subsistence, an d Social Change Among the Navajo, Choctaw an d Pawnee (Lincoln; Univ. o f
Nebraska Press, 1983), 215-227; For N ew M exico and regional climate change in general see Yi-Fu Tuan
and Cyril E. Everhard, “N ew M exico’s Climate; The Appreciation o f a Resource,” Natural Resources
Journal 4 (1964); 269-308 and Tuan, “N ew Mexican Gullies; A Critical Review and Some Recent
Interpretations,” Annals o f the Association o f American Geographers 56 (1966): 573-597; A1 Richmond
and William R Baron, “Precipitation, Range Carrying Capacity, and Navajo Livestock Raising, 1870-1976,”
Agricultural History 63(1989); 217-230, 227; for the drought see especially Edmund Schulman, Tree Ring
Hydrology o f the Colorado River Basin, Laboratory o f Tree Ring Research, Bulletin N o 2, (Tucson; Univ.
o f Arizona Press, 1945), 45-46; Albert J. Richmond, “Historical Precipitation Sequences o f the Colorado
Plateau, 1859-1983,” Unpublished Master’s Thesis (Flagstaff; Northern Arizona U niv., 1987)
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elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the tenacity of the Indian peoples
regarding their ceremonial and agricultural schedules kept projects from progressing at a
pace that would satisfy the engineers. Throughout the year various exigencies of the
Indians’ lives brought work to a standstill. The construction of the Blackrock Dam, for
example, ground to a halt each year as the Zunis prepared for Shalako, the winter solstice
ceremony. Harper was forced to accommodate all of the various ceremonial, hunting,
and planting schedules of the Indians he employed. While the Irrigation Division hoped
for a cheap and docile labor force, what they got were discrete cultural groups operating
on somewhat related, but distinctly different, annual schedules. Thus, irrigation projects
on the Colorado Plateau were largely at the mercy of the combined forces of nature and
Indian cultural vigor, and, to a lesser extent, John B Harper’s relentless pursuit to finish
the Blackrock Dam.
In general, then, the focus of the thesis will be to track the history o f irrigation
efforts on the Navajo and Zuni reservations between 1880-1915.

The dates are not

chosen arbitrarily. No concerted effort was made by the government until the early
1880s to reclaim water on Indian land on the Colorado Plateau. The final date marks a
turn away from large annual expenditures on projects on Indian reservation as the country
geared up for World War I. Also, after 1915 the weather took another turn. But within
that time frame there are some specific issues that I would like to explore. I have chosen
to use climate as framing device because the weather so profoundly affected the history
of these projects.

During the drought, the climate seemed to dictate one kind of

behavior; after the turn of the century, and the return of regular rainfall, another course of
action was necessary.
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As Indian Agents got to know both the country and the Indians during the drought
they made a host of assumptions regarding Indian life. Navajos were strictly nomads—
the Free Riders of the Plains, as one Agent called them; the Zuni never strayed from their
villages. Zunis were harmless, peace loving people, “docile and ignorant,” waiting to be
redeemed by the Indian Service. On the other hand, the Navajo were “wild Indians” in
need of discipline. But all o f them were found wanting. If a permanent water supply
could be secured, the Indians would have all they needed. As I have said, the Navajo
would then settle in villages and the Zuni would pull themselves out o f poverty.
Frederick Hoxie characterized the last twenty years of the nineteenth century as a period
of reform, a time to assimilate Indians into the white mainstream.

Indians could be

remade in the white man’s image in short order through fundamental changes. Agents
would lead by example and Indians would follow; they were merely at an inchoate stage
of development. In the case of the Navajo, for example, if they would end their nomadic
ways, the energy they put into wandering the country with their sheep could be focused
on building villages and raising crops and selling wool at market. But the Indian Service
first had to prove it to them. The reform impulse Hoxie identifies fairly assesses the
situation on the Colorado Plateau in this time period. Agents were frequently frustrated
by Indian ways, but they remained optimistic about the eventual success of their reform
efforts.
Optimism was not enough, however.

Even during conditions of drought the

Indian Service underestimated the power of water. Too, they did not understand that
Indian lifeways could not be changed in a generation. Older ways of knowing nature, of
managing water, could not be supplanted by dams and rationally ordered agricultural
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designs. The Indian Service made plans based on the presumed docility of Indians and
the malleability of water.

The last twenty years of the century were a period of

reconnaissance marked by small reclamation projects and trial and error. It was a time of
learning for the Indian Service. The impressions of Indians that I mentioned above were
formed as Agents began to filter out amongst the reservations.

As they did so they

gathered information on where reclamation projects could be situated

The Indians

Service planned no big projects during this time. But the drought that marked the last
twenty years of the century impressed upon the Agents just how precious water was on
the Colorado Plateau.
The initial focus, then, is this period of reconnaissance. As agents fanned out
across the country in these years they gathered the baseline information regarding how
they would proceed with reclamation projects. This period is one marked by optimism
and naïveté based on scant experience on the Colorado Plateau.

The Indian Service

employed few professional engineers during the nineteenth century. The projects that
they did undertake can be safely characterized as failures.

But to ascribe this to

malicious intent or some sort of malfeasance on the part of the Indian Service would be
wrong. Rather, the men who filled the position of Agent had good intentions; what they
lacked was any conception o f how to reclaim the desert. And the drought that desiccated
the Colorado Plateau only made their mission seem that much more important.
This first part of the thesis, the reconnaissance phase, will be, essentially, a
narrative. I intend to set the stage for events that took place during the first fifteen years
of the twentieth century. To understand the twentieth century it is imperative to have a
clear picture of what went on in the nineteenth. All the impressions of the Indians on the
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Colorado Plateau were made in the last twenty years o f the nineteenth—in regards to
their water needs—and information regarding the physical environment was gathered,
too Thus, when work began in earnest during the early years o f the twentieth century,
the Indian Service was operating on information gathered in the first phase of irrigation
history. And as circumstances changed, that information quickly became worthless. For
example, making judgments about where to build dams based on stream flow collected
during the 1890s was useless during the high flood periods of the first decade of the
twentieth century. Assumptions concerning the docility of the Indian labor force were
also rendered void. Indians would not compromise their ceremonial lives to become day
laborers. When the Indian Service decided to build major waterworks projects on the
Colorado Plateau they found that much of what they learned in the late nineteenth
century did not apply to the changed conditions of the early twentieth.
It is essential to describe just what the Indian Service did find. As well, in order
to contrast it with the twentieth century, emphasis will be placed on the amateurish, ad
hoc way of proceeding with reclamation. The Indian Service designed these projects as
cultural and environmental engineering. They were built to control both people and the
environment in such a way that the Indian Service could then turn its back on both. That
is, the Indian Service wanted to create self sustaining communities on the Colorado
Plateau that would no longer be dependent on the government. What they hoped for was
both a docile native population that would adopt white farming practices, and a pliant
nature that would allow them to do so.

The Indian Service did not consider local

environmental and cultural exigencies in making their plans for irrigation projects. And
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that was their fatal mistake when they entered the twentieth century, and attempted
projects on a heretofore unimagined scale.
If the nineteenth century is marked by optimistic naïveté, and a not a little
blundering, then the early twentieth is a great contrast. Except for the blunders, that is;
they only got worse. As the Indian Service designed larger and larger waterworks, their
naïveté gave way to professionalization, and optimism was replaced by the realities of
building large reclamation projects in the desert. Professional engineers took the place of
individual agents, and the Indian Service soon had its own Irrigation Division.
Progressive Era reformers dictated much that happened in this phase of irrigation history.
Reclamation on a large scale was beginning to be thought of as a way to make much of
the West inhabitable. After the turn of the century, irrigation became a larger, regional
issue, even a national concern. And though few historians have done so, projects on
Indian reservations must be factored into this national context. In the nineteenth century
individual Agents ran reclamation efforts. They were not part o f a national scheme; they
were merely trying to satisfy the needs of the particular reservation they oversaw. When
they saw fit, they asked for money to build small dams or ditches.

In the twentieth

century. Agents no longer occupied such a position. Irrigation efforts were now run by a
professional class of engineers, and the Indian Service allocated annual appropriations in
the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The Indian Service became ensconced in the

gospel of irrigation.

For projects on a more regional scale, the importance o f irrigation for Indians, and brief sketches o f
various projects see, Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 18801920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992,reprint o fth e 1984 University o f Nebraska Press
edition), 169-171; Donald L. Parman, Indians an d the American West in the Twentieth Century
(Bloomington: Indian Univ. Press, 1994), 22-23; Pisani, Chapters 7 and 8 m N atiottalizm g the Waters, Janet
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The history of irrigation development among the Navajo and Zuni Indians is one
marked by failure. What I intend to demonstrate is that the government did not always
run rampant over nature or Indians, rendering them both defenseless and defeated. Gn
the contrary, irrigation efforts on the Colorado Plateau demonstrate cases where tlie
Indian Service misunderstood both nature and Indians, with costly results. The pace of
irrigation efforts was guided by Indians and nature. Ultimately, the Indian Service had
little control over the outcome of their projects. I will show how the climate change and
the cultural vigor of the Indian people of the Colorado Plateau kept irrigation efforts from
being successful. When the focus of development became the Zuni dam, all other
projects fell by the wayside. This resulted in neglect, underdevelopment, and a loosening
of control over the Navajo and their eventual transformation back to pastoralism.
Climate and Indian cultural resilience were not the only factors that guided this story—
politics and economics have a part; too. No two factors alone can ever explain history.
But in the research that I have done they stand out, overwhelmingly, as barriers to Indian
Service plans for the region."
Historian Steve J. Stem characterized the conquistadors’ sixteenth century
“discovery” of the Americas as a quest for a series of utopias—wealth, high social status,
and successful Christian conversion of Indians.

All were visions of utopia, but they

competed with one another. More important than the conquistadors’ mutual antagonism
McDonnell, “Land and Water; Federal Irrigation Projects on Indian Reservations,” in The Dispossessiott o f
the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, ! 991 ). Pisani s is the only one o f
these books not to be exclusively an Indian history that takes into account Indians in the irrigation movement
o f the early twentieth century. His book, when published, will be the most thorough account o f federal
efforts to reclaim Indian land— tw o chapters are devoted to the subject.
" Climate has changed history on the Colorado Plateau before this, too. See Robert C. Euler, G eorge J.
Gumerman, Thor N V Karlstrom, Jefïfey S. Dean, Richard H. Hevly, “The Colorado Plateaus; Cultural
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over their visions of what the New World should be, however, was “the formidable array
of Indian initiative and responses.” Just as in early America, in the American West
Indian agents and reformers envisioned a utopia—settled Indians in self-supporting
farming enterprises. But there were also conflicting visions of that utopia: were the
Navajo farmers or were they pastoralists, for example?

But they all knew that

reclamation of water would redeem Indians; Indians would become independent farmers
and learn the value of private property and hard work. If this worked the Indian Service
could turn its back on Indians; they would no longer be dependent. To be sure, Indian
Agents were not conquistadors, but just as “indigenous responses unraveled European
expectations” in the sixteenth century, so too did they in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Centuries before reclamation efforts began on the Colorado Plateau
“Amerindian peoples fully engaged the struggle to define what the conquest meant.”
And in the period that I will cover they were no less engaged in that struggle.

Not

consciously engaging Indians in the struggle, and I would add the environment to Stem’s
calculus, proved fatal to the Indian Service’s utopia.’^
In American environmental history there are few works that provide one with
models for how to engage Indians actively in history. Too often they are a foil for the
destructive behavior of white Americans—before whites came Indians lived in harmony
with nature and their lives should be used as object lessons.

Environmental history

frequently lapses into descriptions of a lost and pristine world that existed when only
Indians and nature graced the planet—the Indian past is mined for examples o f how to
Dynamics and Paleoenvironment; Prehistoric cultural changes on the Colorado Plateaus were
contemporaneous with environmental changes,” Science 205(1979): 1089-1101,
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live in the present and the future. The impression is that Indians tiptoed across the earth
until the boots of white America stomped over them and the environment. In one of the
best known environmental histories of reclamation, Donald Worster does this very thing.
In Rivers o f Empire, the Zuni and other Indians are used as symbols of harmony with
nature; their way of living with the desert was harmless. But once capitalism moved
west, destructive ways of knowing nature supplanted peaceful ones. Indians in his story
are used only to juxtapose two ways of knowing and using nature: precapitalist and
capitalist. We really learn little about Indians. Indeed, they seem to be thought of as
inextricable from nature.

Were we to take this version o f Indian history as solid and

unshakable there would be little reason for trying to find ways in which Indians managed
to engage in their own history, for Indians and their ways of knowing nature appear to be
gone.
I try hard not to be guilty of the sins listed above. My hope is not to paint a
picture of good guys and bad guys. The engineers and agents in this story are most often
guilty of arrogance bom from ignorance. They appear hapless, to be sure, but, hopefully,
not evil. The story plays out on the Indians’ home turf, whereas the whites are on foreign
ground. Thus, what happens is often more a learning experience and shock to them than
it is to the Indians. They are perpetually flummoxed by the weather, Indian ceremonial

Steve J. Stem , “Paradigms o f Conquest; History, Historiography, and Politics," Jourtml o f Latin
American Studies 24 (1992): 7, 15.
Donald Worster, Rivers o f Empire: Water, Aridity, an d the Growth o f the American West (N ew York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), 32-36. I realize that Worster was not writing Indian history and should not be
taken to task for a book that he should have written but did not But on the other hand, one imagines that
all vestiges o f what he calls the local subsistence m ode are wiped out. W e differ. I imagine the history o f
the W est, or anywhere for that matter, as a series o f layers, a palimpsest, and those layers continually nose
their way to the fore and then retreat, and vice-versa . The past never simply vanishes.
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life and agricultural and hunting practices. Both the Indians and the whites must respond
to each other.
No good histoiy evolves in a vacuum. Debts are owed to previous work. And in
this thesis, I will draw on two works that have provided me with substantial capital. The
notion that there are competing visions of what nature is, and that those differing visions
serve to inform environmental history, has been explored recently in two books. Mart
Stewart’s 'Wliat Nature Sttffers to Groe': Life, Labor, and Landscape on the Georgia
Coast,

1680-1920,

and Louis Warren’s

The Hunter's

Game: Poachers and

Conservationists in Twentieth Century America. Both Stewart and Warren demonstrate,
in vastly different geographical spaces, that nature means different things to different
people. Different ways of knowing nature often clash and serve to produce outcomes
other than the one intended by the dominant group—planters and conservationists,
respectively. Both works demonstrate how local responses unraveled particular utopian
visions.
Stewart and Warren write into their stories people who are often not accorded
agency in determining their own histories. In Stewart’s case, slaves direct their own
history as much as the planters do and vice-versa; in Warren’s book, the poor, Italian
immigrants, and Indians foul up the plans of twentieth century conservationists by
defiantly utilizing nature—in this case hunting—in ways in which they have for
generations, contrary to the visions of the conservationists.

And in both books,

environmental forces, some man-made and some not, direct history. Not taking into
account differing ways of knowing nature, and understanding the world at large, proved
fatal to both conservationists and planters. This thesis takes the same position: the Indian
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Service’s utopia on the Colorado Plateau was thwarted by Indian responses and by the
natural environment, both of which the Indian Service mistakenly thought could be
controlled or, alternately, did not consider. In this case, it is not merely that Indians and
the environment have not been accorded adequate agency by historians, but they were not
factored in when the history was being made. Thus, there is a dual burden: writing them
into the historiography and, at the same time, retrieving them from history.
On the sea coast of antebellum Georgia, historian Mart Stewart found that in
order to wrest a profit from the land planters needed to “maintain an ordered equilibrium
of social relations to sustain the fragile ecological ones.” The folk beliefs of the slaves—
some brought from Africa, others that metastasized in America as Christianity seeped
into their religions—were thought of as foolishness by their masters.

Concerns over

health and the origins of diseases, for example, struck master and slave very differently.
In an instance when several slaves look sick on the Butler plantation, and a dozen or so
died on a neighboring plantation, slaves and masters took the root cause to be two very
different things. Slaves believed that they had been cursed by a conjurer; the plantation’s
head driver; the overseer, on the other hand, thought this was nonsense, and put the
sickness down to one of the many “fevers” that periodically befell the human population

Agency, o f course, does not mean that nature and people act with calculated precision in every decision
they make, aware o f the consequences at all times. Indeed, nature has no consciousness, per se. Rather,
human and natural agency plug into a structure that is built as much by their actions as anything. Anthony
Giddens has written, “Human agency and structure... are logically implicated with one another. Structure is
the very medium o f the ‘human’ element o f human agency. At the same time, agency is the medium o f
structure, which individuals routinely reproduce in their activities.” I merely add, not indefensibly, the
environment to the medium o f structure in determining history. Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and
M odern Sociology (Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1987), 221 ; Giddens, who has written widely on the
subject, defmes agency thusly, “Agency concerns events o f which an individual is the perpetrator, in the
sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence o f conduct, have acted differently ” The
Com iiiiition o f Society: Outline o f the Theoiy o f Structuration (Berkeley: Univ. o f California Press, 1984)
9.
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in this malarial environment. But whatever the cause the result was the same; a contested
version of what the disease meant. And this threatened the fragile equilibrium of the
plantation.'^
Slaves, Stewart avers, wanted to retain control over matters concerning their
bodies, while masters sought to manage not only the slaves production, but also their
reproduction—a realm that slaves were reluctant to let outsiders into.

Competing

interests over health and reproduction, Stewart maintains, resembled contestations over
the environment. “The clear distinctions that [planters and overseers] made between the
spiritual and the material worlds and between humans and their activities and the
working of the natural world were not commonly made by slaves.”

When the

equilibrium of social relations was threatened, problems with production occurred on the
plantation. Slaves knew the environment better than the planters. Little in nature was
outside their ken, thus keeping that balance was essential to the successful operation of
the plantation. In an environment as tough to work as the tidewater of the Georgia coast,
control over labor was as essential as control over the environment; but planters rarely
maintained total control over either one. Competing versions of the natural and spiritual
worlds saw to it that the process of manipulating the environment and people was a
constant process of negotiation between master and slave. It is the conversation, indeed,
at times the argument, that takes place between culture and nature that shapes history.
Neither one acts upon the other without a rebuttal; both have agency. The Indian Service
encountered similar problems on the Colorado Plateau. Discussing Stewart’s work on
the Georgia coast serves to show that problems between competing versions of nature.
Mart A. Stewart, 'What Nature Suffers to Groe

life . Labor, atid Landscape on the Georgia Coast,

R eproduced with perm ission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

that result in attempts at social control, occurred not only in Indian America, but
elsewhere as well. Both on the Georgia coast and on the Colorado Plateau equilibrium of
social relations was rarely achieved.

And, on the Colorado Plateau, this kept the

irrigation enterprise from being successful.'^
Louis Warren’s The Hunter's Game also manages to give agency to nature and
other, often silent voices in conservation history. Conservation of hunting grounds in the
public interest—to keep them out of the hands of the elite—was not the democratic
process that the consensus on conservation history would have us believe.'’

The

Hunter's Game traverses three disparate geographies and tells three different stories. But
they all convey that in the United States, over the last century, there were local, unique
ways of knowing the natural world and that those ways were, in the main, supplanted by
extra-local control.

And that extra-local control was primarily federal or state

government. Warren argues in this wonderful book that local commons—natural space
that was “managed” and used for the benefit o f a local population—has been taken over
by a centralized power that has tried to implant a single, national way of knowing nature.
And in each case this has meant that certain groups get marginalized, the poor,
immigrants, and Indians. In Warren’s story, local uses of hunting grounds gradually gave
way to extra-local control of those hunting grounds. What was once a local commons,
governed by local custom, was subverted by a national conservation agenda that tried to
J6S0-I920 (Athens, Ga. : Univ. o f Georgia Press, 1996), 139.
145,
See, for example, Samuel P Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f Efficiency: The Progressive
Conservation Movement. 1890-1920 (Cambridge; Harvard Univ Press, 1959). Hays recognizes that the top
down way that conservation leaders envisioned resource planning working often clashed with local interests.
But these were white interests, often local elites. At the very least he w as speaking o f local property
owners, something the poor Italians and Indians in Warren’s book were not. For a good criticism o f
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create a national commons.

Warren’s book tracks the story from state control to an

admixture of state and national control to one of complete national control. In each of
the three case studies—Italian immigrants in Pennsylvania, Apaches and Navajos in New
Mexico, and Blackfeet in Montana—extra-local interests tried to and did supplant local
ways of knowing nature. But it was a bit more complex than that. In all three cases,
local white elites gleefully went along for the ride if it meant curtailing access to hunting
by any one of the above mentioned groups.

Thus, it was more than a contest over

redefining local hunting grounds, it was battle over access.
Conservationists wanted to preserve hunting grounds for the common man, and in
the case of Glacier National Park, they wanted to curtail hunting altogether. In all three
case studies Warren demonstrates that the utopian notion of the conservationists-—
limiting access essentially to white hunters who could afford the cost of a license—
unraveled as contingencies they did not expect kept creeping up on them. At Glacier,
conservationists tried to create a natural utopia, a “world of people on the outside, [and a]
world of nature on the inside.” But boundaries do not quite work that way, and the effect
of restricting hunting was an ungulate irruption that devastated park fauna. The Park
Service even resorted to feeding the deer and elk to keep them from starving and away
from Indian hunters outside the Park. Eventually, once the Park elk population reached
critical mass, the Park Service chased the animals out of Glacier to be hunted by the
same Blackfeet they were trying to protect the deer and elk from in the first place! Lack

conservation history see, Donald J. Pisani, “Forests and Reclamation, 1891-1911,” Forest and

Conservation History 37 (1993): 68-79, especially 76,
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o f understanding of previous, local ways of using nature proved fatal to the Park
Service’s utopia. It was rendered a pipe dream.
This thesis follows Warren’s and Stewart’s leads. Local responses—from both
the environment and Indians—to extra-local forces kept the irrigation enterprise from
being successful.

The Indian Service’s inability to achieve social and ecological

equilibrium because of conflicting ways of conceiving of the natural world also proved
disastrous. The agricultural utopia that the Indian Service envisioned on the Colorado
Plateau failed to engage Indians actively in the process. The Navajo and Zuni, however,
directed events more than the Indian Service could have ever imagined. As Steve Stem
said, failure to engage the Indians proved disastrous.

Louis Warren, “Blackfeet and Boundaries at Glacier National Park,” in The Hunter's Game (N ew Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1997), quote on 128.
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The Climate on the Colorado Plateau: Perceptions and Reality with Some
Thoughts on Climate History

To Indian agents in the late nineteenth century, the semi-arid Colorado Plateau
was like no landscape they had ever seen.

The dryness, wind, and lack o f green

vegetation evoked feelings akin to hostility in many of the agents. The scarcity of water
was frightening to many o f them. More than one considered the land barren and useless.
D M. Riordan, agent on the Navajo reservation in the early 1880s, thought the Navajo
country to be the “most worthless land that ever laid out-doors. It is wholly a sandstone
mesa country, with occasional patches of valley land susceptible to cultivation by the
rude Indian methods. It is almost waterless—in fact, a barren, rocky desert... The face of
the country is almost entirely rock. Rock everywhere.”' Rarely, if ever, did they marvel
at the landscape. In almost all instances they saw the Colorado Plateau in negative tenus.
Officials of the U.S. government rarely had anything but contempt for the landscape of
the Southwest. Indeed, the hostility felt toward the region kept it from being heavily
explored and administrated.

Only after white population skyrocketed did the U.S.

government take an active role in administering the region. Before 1890, to be sure,
there was a military presence in the region, but the government’s limited resources saw to
it that other, more profitable, less hostile regions of the West got attention. After 1890,
and the increase in trade because of the railroad and mining, the region was taken more
seriously. As irrigation gained currency, the Southwest was looked on in a different

‘ D M Riordan quoted in Herbert Welsh, “Report o f a Visit to the Navajo, Pueblo, and Hualapais Indians o f
N ew M exico and Arizona” (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1885), 37.
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light.

But the initial lack of interest in the Southwest was due, in large part, to

perceptions o f its climate, physical environment, and Indian population. “
In the 1880s, agents were very eager to get reclamation works underway. But the
semi-arid climate was tricky; it at once intensified the pace of irrigation efforts and
fooled the agents. The lack of frequent rain and the presence of few permanent streams
and springs convinced agents that they needed to build waterworks. However, when rain
did fall it came in torrents. Ephemeral streams that lay dormant much of the year came
to life during the two rainy seasons: December-March and June-August. The attendant
floods washed out the small dams and ditches the agents built They repeated this cycle
year after year throughout the first phase of irrigation history. Their desire to see the
desert bloom, and the constant turnover of agents, blinded them to the yearly cycle of
rain and flooding. The agents’ conceptions of the climate are of particular importance,
for it was their impressions that guided irrigation efforts in the region. They had very
little information to go on in this early phase of irrigation history, and they generally
made their decisions based on their impressions.
Early Spanish visitors to the Southwest, particularly the Colorado Plateau country
of New Mexico, found the climate, except for the cold winters, to be favorable. They
remarked on wide valleys and grasslands that would make for good pasturage. Abundant
streams were noted, too. Probably coming as they did from the arid and semiarid regions
of Mexico and Spain, the climate of New Mexico did not impress them as significantly
different.

The climate of Mexico, and even parts of Spain, prepared them for the

conditions in New Mexico. But when Anlgos arrived from the East, they formed wholly

Robert W ooster, “’A Difficult and Forlorn Country’: The Military Looks at the American Southwest,
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different impressions. Explorers in the early 1850s found the region barren and devoid of
economic prospects. They noted that grass was abundant in places, and scarce in others.
In 1849, Lieutenant J.H. Simpson, on an exploratory mission of the Navajo country, said
that one would have a hard time looking on the country “without a sense of loathing.”
Early white explorers of the region, concerned with grass and water for their stock and
themselves, make good sources of information regarding environmental conditions—if
only impressionistic ones. The diaries and official reports of explorers gathered and
analyzed by Luna Leopold reveal a Southwest at best marginal. Account after account
reports on the difficulty in finding forage and water. But other, conflicting impressions
could be formed, too.

Only a few years after Simpson, other Anglos from the East

remarked on the salubrity of the climate. W.W.H. Davis, U.S. Attorney in New Mexico,
said that a better climate could not be found anywhere in the world.'
What accounts for these wildly varying accounts? Geographers Yi-Fu Tuan and
Cyril Everhard argue that a sudden, but brief, shift in the climate in the early 1850s
changed the appearance of much o f New Mexico. In Santa Fe, for example, there was
fully three times as much rain in both 1854 and 1855 as there was in 1850. Thus, two
different observers, only a few years apart, were able to have quite varied impressions of
the landscape due to a marked increase in rainfall. This may seem an obvious conclusion
to draw. Naturally, two different people coming to New Mexico at different times under
different weather conditions would report varying impressions. But more important than
that, it illustrates the fluctuation of New Mexico’s climate and exemplifies a common

1850-1890,” Arizona and the West 28(1986) 355.
^ Tuan and Everhard, 271-274; Luna Leopold, “Vegetation o f Southwestern Watersheds in the Nineteenth
Century,” The Geographical Review 41(1951): 295-316,
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phenomena later in the century; As the turnover of Indian agents occurred on an almost
biannual basis in the 1880s and 90s, they gathered quick, impressionistic views on the
climate o f the region. A dry summer alarmed agents; a wet one delighted them. Like
Simpson and Davis, agents following in the heels of one another could have varying
impressions of the climate. Gathering any long term impressions of what New Mexico’s
climate was like seemed impossible. None of them stayed long enough to gather any
strategies for how to deal with the capricious climate. They formed opinions generally
devoid of value when it came time to plan major reclamation projects. Herbert Welsh,
not an agent himself but president of the Indian Rights Association, was hopeful that “the
approach of the civilization and the introduction of the railroads are producing some
modification o f the climate here, as they seem to have done in other parts of the West.”
If this was the kind of information that planners had to go on—a slightly modified rain
follows the plow prediction—then successful reclamation projects would be unlikely. As
mentioned in the introduction, when the climate did take a noticeable turn toward a
series of wet years at the turn of the twentieth century, the lack of captured information,
and often contradictory impressions, proved damaging to reclamation efforts.*
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century a drought desiccated the
Southwest.

In the last half-millennia only one other drought has been worse, that

between 1573-1593. But the dry cycle that visited the Southwest between 1879 and 1904

Tuan and Everhard; Welsh, 33; On the concept o f capturing see Carole Crumley, “The E cology o f
Conquest; Contrasting Agropastoral and Agricultural Societies’ Adaptation to Climate Change,’’ and Joel D.
Gunn, “Global Climate Change and Regional Biocultural Diversity,” in Historical Exology: Cultural
Knowledge an d Changing Landscapes (Santa Fe. School o f American Research Press, distributed by Univ.
o f Washington Press, 1994); John W. Bennett, “Adaptations by Tribal and M odem Populations to the North
American Plains and other Arid and Semiarid Lands: A Survey o f Issues and Problems,” in John W. Bennett,
Humati Ecology as Human Behasnor: Essays in Environmental an d Development Anthropology' (N ew
Brunswick, NJ.: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 160.
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was the longest running. Less rainfall fell during the previous cycle, but the modem
drought was longer in duration. Exacerbating the modem drought was the presence of
sheep and a greater human population.^ Within the major drought there were anomalous
years, to be sure. And the agents who came to the Colorado Plateau, of course, had no
idea that they were enduring a string of the driest years of the last millennia. After 1905,
the region experienced its longest run of wet years.

Again, there were dry years

throughout, just as there were yet years during the drought. However, the two general
trends of dry, then wet, can safely be established.*"
Most importantly, the dry and wet trends closely parallel the movements of the
Indian Service in the area. In the last twenty years of the nineteenth century agents first
attempted reclamation. As the effects of the drought—livestock reduction, disappearing
springs—began to be noticed the Indian Service determined that more needed to be done
to secure water than individual agents could do with limited resources.

What little

information agents did capture during the nineteenth century only prepared them for
drought. But providence was not on the side of the Indian Service. Plans for a major
dam on the Zuni reservation were made during the drought, but construction of the
Blackrock Dam coincided precisely with the cycle of increased rainfall and flooding. As
ad hoc efforts gave way to professional ones, drought was replaced by rain and floods.
The shift, in climate and the deepening of commitment to irrigation converged in the
early twentieth century.

And this had serious implications for reclamation.

^ On the increase in sheep, see Denevan, “Livestock Numbers..
^ Schuhnan, 43-46, and see note seven in the introduction for further evidence o f the drought and
subsequent wet years.
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escalated year after year as more rain and flooding destroyed waterworks on the Zuni and
Navajo reservations.
The drought years of the late nineteenth century gave way to ill informed
predictions of stream flow. Because no long term monitoring had been done, combined
with a general refusal to tap Indian memory of weather, the Indian Service had scant data
to go on in planning reclamation projects.

There is no doubt that the Navajo, for

example, could have provided the Indian Service with at least some information on the
climate. Their knowledge of the cycles of the weather and the character of rain, for
example, might have given the Indian Service some indication of the mercurial nature of
the weather. The Zunis’ and the Navajos’ intimate knowledge of plant life, what grew
where and under what conditions, would have proved useful to the Indian Service. The
Navajo identified more than one type of the rain. In some years, or in different seasons
the male rain—heavy, and often destructive— fell; and in others, the female rain—light,
and good for crops—dampened the ground. It is possible, maybe even likely, that the
Navajo and Zuni had a storehouse of collective memories regarding when in the past
different types of rain fell, or when plants dependent on one type of rain or another did
well or poorly. This type of information was not written down; it was embedded in the
knowledge that was collected over centuries of living on the Colorado Plateau.

In

calculating how much rain would fall each year, and hence the capacity of the reservoir
at Zuni, the single most important factor was the “character of the rain storms.” The
water planners needed to know just when the heavy rains fells, and how heavy they could
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be. That is, they needed to know: when did male rain come and when did female rain
come?’
The lack of information concerning the climate led to costly errors. In 1903, after
making an inspection of the Zuni dam site, W.H. Code, then an inspector for the Indian
Service and later Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Division, concluded with great
confidence that the highest floods his calculations could predict for the Zuni River would
be a mere 3,000 to 4,000 cubic feet per second. By 1907, after witnessing four seasons of
destructive flooding, he changed his tune and estimated that 9,000 cubic feet per second
was a conservative figure.

Code’s initial estimate was only based on well informed

guesses, however. Code felt that he could rely only on the few white residents in the area
for any anecdotal evidence of stream flow. The well spring of information that was
captured over the centuries by the Indians in the region was not tapped by Indian agents
or Irrigation Division water planners.

Rather, year after year, they seemed intent on

reinventing the wheel, or rather the humid East, and not looking to the long term
residents of the region for guidance regarding the climate.*
After twenty years of drought the Indian Service was hardly prepared for the
torrents of rain, and attendant freshets that filled the region’s waterways in the first
decade of the twentieth century. The climate change dampened irrigation plans. W.H.
Code, Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Division of the Indian Service, reported that the

^ Matilda C oxe Stevenson, “Ethnobotany o f the Zuni Indians,” M S# 4841 and “N otes on Medical Botany,”
M S# 2089; W.W. Hill, “Field N otes and Draft o f Manuscript on the Agricultural and Hunting M ethods o f
the Navajo Indians,” 1933, M S# 7101, National Anthropological Archives (N A A ), Smithsonian Institution,
Washington, D C , Washington Matthews, “Navajo Names for Plants,” American Naturalist 20 (1886); 767777; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 13 April 1903, B ox 212 , SC 190, RG 75, NA.
* W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 13 April 1903, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; W .H Code to
John B. Harper, Superintendent o f Irrigation, 28 December 1907, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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weather conditions of 1905 were the worst “known to the oldest inhabitant of New
Mexico.” One long term observer of the Southwest, Matilda Coxe Stevenson, wrote
from Taos in 1906 that she had never experienced such high winds and rains as she did
that summer.

And John B Harper reported that the whole “face of the country is

changed.” He wrote later that summer, “since the end of September 1904, the entire
southwest has been having a period of great and frequent storms and unusual weather
conditions, and this has added greatly to the difficulties and uncertainties of the
[irrigation] enterprise.”^ The drought of the last century was over.

And the Indian

Service was faced with a new challenge; where once drought made their work seem
crucial, heavy rain and flooding now stymied their efforts.
Infusing the history of climate into human history is a tricky business. Personally,
I have been warned not to take slight fluctuations outside of the “normal” variegated
weather on the Colorado Plateau as scientific proof of a climate c h a n g e . I would
counter that impressionistic data gathered concerning climate can be more important, as
argued above, than a scientifically proven climate change.

In using climate as a

causative factor in history there are limitations that exist and methodological problems
that are difficult to overcome. Climate cannot be looked at in a vacuum; the risk is too
great of making deterministic conclusions. Climate is never the only factor involved in
altering history. Indeed, in many discussions of the role of climate in history, extreme
caution is advised. In particular, historians are wary of ascribing any significance to
^ W .H Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 12 December 1905, RG 75, SC 190, B ox 212, NA; Matilda
C oxe Stevenson to William Henry Holmes, 7 July 1906, Stevenson Correspondence, 1890-1918, B ox 6a,
NAA; John B. Harper to CIA, 5 July 1906, #41728, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 8
January 1 9 0 6 ,, #67729, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA. For sources regarding the climate change see note
9 in the introduction.
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short term climatic change. The common wisdom says that if quantifiable data cannot be
gathered that proves that climate was indeed a factor in affecting history than we would
be better served dismissing it, or, at the very least, listing it as one of many factors
determining history. In using climate as a pivot point in this story I have tried to use
caution. I do not think that the short term climatic pulse that occurred at the beginning of
the twentieth century was the only variable in shaping Navajo and Zuni history. But it
was very important. ' ’
Short term climate change gets short shrift in discussions of climate and history.
Economic historian Jan de Vries is skeptical o f its influence on historical events. Short
term “exogenous shocks” likely have no effect on economic history, Just as the history of
bank robberies surely have no effect on the history of banking.

Acknowledging his

remarks as sarcastic and overstated, de Vries, nevertheless, remains unwilling to look at
short term change as anything but descriptive and speculative.

In his estimation,

gathered from the insights of Emanuel LeRoy Ladurie, societies settle back into a
“normal” routine after short term pulses, and their effects remain difficult to detect. The
reluctance that Ladurie and de Vries share on this issue comes from their insistence on
studying long-term trends. As de Vries say, “The possibility that long-term changes in
Personal communication from William R. Baron, 29 July 1997, in author’s possession.
The literature on climate change and history is vast. The following have been som e o f the most
instructive. M.J. Ingram, G. Farmer, and T.M.L. Wigley, “Past Climates and their impact on Man: a
review,” in Climate an d History: Studies in pa st climates and their impact on Man, Wigley, Ingram, and
Farmer, eds. (Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), while the authors generally eschew short term
climate change, they do concede that “[tjhere may conceivably be grounds for ascribing greater importance
to a few isolated climatic events which happened to impinge on key historical situations,” 27, which is
precisely what I contend is the case at the turn o f the century in the Southwest; Jan D e Vries, “Measuring
the Impact o f Climate on History: The Search for Appropriate M ethodologies,” in Climate and Histoiy:
Studies in Interdisciplinary History, Robert 1 Rotbergand Theodore K. Rabb, eds. (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1981); Emanuel LeR oy Ladurie, “The Historical Study o f Climate,” in Times o f Feast, Times o f
Famine: A History o f Climate Since the Year 1000 (N ew York: Doubleday, 1971); William R. Baron,
“Retrieving American Climate History: A Bibliographic Essay,” Agricultural History 63 (1989): 7-35.
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climate might play a role in historical explanation constitutes the most exciting
dimension of climate history.” According to de Vries, too often studies of short terra
climate change fall into the “harm done” mode of thinking; they merely describe how
deleterious a climate change was. (I would add that the converse could be true, but agree
that most describe harmful effects.) And the ultimate irrelevance of this type of study is
proven, in the end, by the fact that societies adapt. Thus, studying short term change
serves little or no end but to describe conditions at a given moment in time. But that
given moment in time can have lasting effects. If the short term pulse can be shown to
suggest, or prove, lasting effects, then it should be considered as more than a blip on the
historical record. Thomas Hall has drawn an apt metaphor. If we can think of social
change as a ratchet and pawl mechanism, then short term climate change can be shown to
have lasting effects.

Hall’s metaphor applies to levels of incorporation but can be

applied to other situations. It works like this; a technology or exogenous shock, for
example, is introduced into a society, or band, and if it comes at the right moment in time
then the outside force can be very hard to resist. It introduces changes that alter history
in fundamental ways. Once the Comanche acquired horses the ecology of their hunting
grounds became so drastically changed that reverting back to foraging became
impossible.

There is always some slippage, but reversal becomes more and more

difficult, I would include short term climate change, at particular historical moments, as
having potential to act on this principle. The short term climate change forced the Indian
Service to reevaluate reclamation projects and its relationship with the Zuni and Navajo.
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Additionally, it led the Indian Service, as 1 will show, to overstock the Navajo reservation
with sheep as they realized the folly of reclaiming Navajoland.
deVries’s thinking smacks of some sort o f excessive, backwards relativism. That
is, in it most extreme form, relativism posits that all instances, or thoughts, or value
systems, have equal merit and thus none can be judged better than another. If we accept
de Vries’s way of seeing short term climate change then no short term change can have
any significance. And that’s not relative to one another, that’s the category as a whole.
If all “societies in the long run adjust,” then there is no point in studying short term
change because we already the know the outcome (in a general, not a specific, sense).
Not all cases have their own merits that need to be weighed regarding peculiar, local
circumstances.

Rather, historians should dispense with short term studies because

adaptation will occur and it is that adaptation that should be studied

I agree that the

adaptations to climate changes should be studied, but so, too, should short term climate
change. The reluctance to study short term change strikes me as odd. One could argue
that any “exogenous shock,” such as war, will eventually subside and societies will adapt.
But, first of all, isn’t figuring out what those short term changes are an important task? If
we are to figure out in what ways societies adapt, is it not imperative that we find out
what events they are adapting to?

On the Colorado Plateau, in the early twentieth

century, the Indian Service attempted to adapt to a semiarid environment. What they did
not know was that they were, in fact, adapting to a short term climatic change—the 18791904 drought. The drought was, of course, part o f a series of climate changes tracked
over the Course of nearly seven centuries. When the Indian Service attempted adaptation.
Thomas D. Hall, Social Change in the Southwest. 1350~I880 (Lawrence: Univ. Press o f Kansas, 1987),
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another climate change occurred, this time in the form of a series of wet years. They
adapted to this, too. Understanding how this climatic change forced the adaptations that
it did strikes me as the important task. Too, as I have said, the agents and engineers
living the history considered what was going on important, and retrieving their
impressions of the relevance of the climate change is crucial.
Short term climatic change in this instance has singular importance.

Indian

policy was evolving at such a rapid pace during this time that otherwise insignificant
events like a short term climatic change could have profound etYects. Fifty years in the
past a short term change may not have had lasting effects; Indians would have adapted.
But as the Indian Service shifted from policies that discouraged large-scale reclamation
efforts to ones that embraced them—based largely on a national movement that endorsed
reclamation—the climate changed.

The shifts in Indian Service policy were

accompanied by sudden changes in the climate.

Institutional change paralleled

environmental change. And this is why this short term change is important; it can be
directly linked to another, contemporaneous historical change.

This is, of course, a

historical coincidence. But it may point to the need to further consider short term climate
change as an important shaper o f history.

n
On the surface, increase in rainfall may not appear to be dramatic.

An inch

difference between one year and the next, either up or down, when spread out over a
21 .
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whole state or region is a meaningless statistic.

To say that the Colorado Plateau

experienced either an upward or downward trend only takes on meaning when one
examines local conditions.

One needs to look at local examples, judged upon local

topography, settlement patterns, and in the case of this study, irrigation development, to
be able to gauge the impact of seemingly incremental average increases in rainfall. As
Luna Leopold cautioned, “It should be remembered that annual values of precipitation
may obscure short-period features in the rainfall pattern which in themselves might have
great significance.”’^
If one examines the rainfall statistics for Tuba, Arizona, at the western edge of the
Navajo Reservation, one would see that between 1897 and 1913 the mean annual rainfall
is a mere 5.30 inches. That’s not much.

However, upon closer examination of the

monthly rainfall, and the shifts in which month that rain comes, one finds illuminating
information. In November 1905 and 1906, for instance, 2.5 to 3.0 inches of rain fell,
when compared with other Novembers in which somewhere between a trace and 1 inch
fell. And remember, November falls outside the normal rainy season. Take another
example: In January of 1907, 2.0 inches of rain fell at Tuba, but the mean given is .49
for 1897 to 1913 One-half inch of rain is not a destructive amount, but two surely is if
waterworks projects are in the way of the inevitable floods that that much rain would
likely produce. And in most years, again, somewhere between a trace and 1 inch of rain
fell on the desert at Tuba.

Luna Leopold, “Rainfall Frequency: An Aspect o f Climatic Variation,” Transactions, American
Geophysical Union 32 (1 9 5 1);347-357,347
Herbert Gregory, The Navajo Country: A Geographic and Hydrographic Reconnaissance o f Parts o f
Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Supply Paper #380, 64th. Cong., 2"“^sess.,
1916, H D oc. 80, Serial 7024, 552-63, 85-87. One o f the best sources for climate studies on the Colorado
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The same is true for much of the rest o f the Colorado Plateau: While mean annual
increases may not appear significant, local changes, that happen to be in some of the
same places that the Irrigation Division was building waterworks, could be enormous.
Increases in local storms, of course, affected stream flow, and thus, flooding patterns.
The Little Colorado River at Holbrook, Arizona is a good example. In November 1905,
the mean flow of the river was 1,159 acre feet, higher than any other month of the year,
but not too much higher in this wettest of years. The mean, of course, is the average of
the high and the low. And the low for November was a trickle of 30 acre feet. But the
maximum flow was a staggering and devastating 20,180 acre feet! You could add up the
flows from 1905-07 and still not approach the flow for that one month.
Along with climatic records, the anecdotal evidence of the change in climate is
overwhelming. In fact, it is arguably more important than the tree-ring, streamflow, or
rainfall records. Because the weather changed so dramatically in such a short time,
Indian Service employees working in the region noted it, almost without exception, in
their correspondence. It affected their day to day operations. Work had to be stopped
and costs ran way over budget due to flooding, for example. Using this kind of evidence,
not in lieu of, but to bolster official records, only makes the case stronger. To the agents
and engineers on the ground, there was a climate change. The sudden change in the

Plateau is Albert J. Richmond’s “Historical Precipitation Sequences o f the Colorado Plateau, 1859-1983.”
Richmond examined fifty long-term stations around the region and compiled a database o f daily, monthly,
and yearly precipitation data. Along with precipitation amounts, Richmond also calculated frequency.
Unfortunately, the massive database that he constructed is now defunct All that remains is his thesis, which
has graphs charting year by year change. This more general data, however, still bears out the increase in
rainfall amount and frequency during the period in question.
Gregory.
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weather did affect operations and influence policy decisions.’^ Citing the climate change
as the pivot point in the history of irrigation development on the Colorado Plateau comes
from the anecdotal evidence One could conceivably examine rainfall records alongside
expenditures on waterworks projects and make some guesses as to how the weather
affected decisions. But the correspondence leaves no doubt; the climate change affected
engineers’ and agents’ decisions and behavior.
As we will see in the discussions of the waterworks projects at Navajo and Zuni,
these local increases in rainfall and attendant flooding had devastating effects on the
irrigation enterprise. As mentioned earlier, the Zuni River, which through most of the
late nineteenth century contact period was considered the ideal source for a nem nanent
water supply, became a torrent when significant rain fell on the Colorado Plateau. In
1902, the second year of surveys for the Blackrock dam, the Colorado Plateau, according
to Schulman, experienced the driest year of the twenty-six year drought. Little water
coursed through the Zuni R iv er that year Rut w h en a short term in ten se ch a n g e in th e
weather arrived, it spelled disaster for the Zuni dam, as well as other projects.

The

change forced the Indian Service to critically evaluate projects on the Colorado Plateau.
It appears that they considered the change signs o f a permanent condition—the same
assumption they made about the drought in the closing years of the previous century At
the very least, they began to wonder if ever they could get a handle on the climate of the
Colorado Plateau. With the return of wet weather, the Navajo reservation could be more

William R. Baron, in very good essay on the value o f American climate history states, “A source o f
climate date that is perhaps richer in detail and has a better geographic distribution than instrument records is
qualitative documentation found in such sources as diaries, almanacs, old newspapers, and periodicals,” O f
course, Ï would add correspondence. William R. Baron, “Retrieving American Climate History . A
Bibliographic Essay” Agricultural H istory 63( 1989).7-35.
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heavily stocked with sheep. The consequences of the overstocking of the Navajo range
are out of the scope of this study. But the origins of the overstocking come out of this
era

The Indian Service had always recognized that sheep and pastoralism were

important to the Navajo, but they insisted on developing irrigation works for farming
Now, after the improvement of the range, a renewed commitment to helping the Navajo
in their pastoral pursuits marked Indian Service reclamation policy among the Navajo.
Shifting perceptions of the climate made this possible.
In the late nineteenth century the Indian Service made a concerted effort to get to
know the Navajo and their homeland.

This era of discovery led them to deign the

reservation and the Navajo worthy of reclamation. The Zunis, on the other hand, while
scrutinized by anthropologists, did not come under close Indian Service examination.
Waterworks did not receive the full attention of the Indian Service until the first years of
the twentieth century

The dry, parched looking, arroyo scarred Colorado Plateau

alarmed Indian agents. Something needed to be done to turn it into a garden.
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“Look at Our Country; We Ought to Be Ashamed of It": Reclamation Efforts
on the Navajo Reservation, 1883-1900

Many Horses learned from his father and namesake, the Navajo leader Ganado
Mucho, to reserve a healthy amount of skepticism for prophets and medicine men among
his people. In the decade after their captivity at Bosque Redondo, and the failure of that
experiment, the Navajo returned to their homeland, now a much shrunken area and a
reservation, and tried to regain harmony with their world. But the disaffection that many
felt at the loss of life and livestock, possibly lubricated by alcohol consumption, caused
unrest. As a result, a wave of witchcraft washed over the reservation in the late 1870s.
Navajos and white authorities hunted down scores of witches. Ganado Mucho killed
even his own uncle in an effort to quell the fervor.

Ganado Mucho and Manuelito,

another Navajo leader, killed between them an estimated forty witches. Ganado Mucho
was an advocate of peace with whites and the recent unrest threatened to unravel the
fragile trust that had been achieved.’
Ganado Mucho, consequently, did not trust medicine men—whom he considered
no better than witches—and urged his son to be wary too, warning him not to fool with
witchcraft. But in a moment of fragility, when Ganado Mucho was dying, his son spent
the bulk of his fortune on the services of a medicine man to banish from his father the
evil spirits that lay within him. He sold his herds of cattle, sheep, and horses.

The

fortunes of Ganado Mucho and Many Horses vanished. Ganado Mucho chastised his son
' Underhill, 160-161; Garrick Bailey and Roberta Glenn Bailey, A History o f the Navajos: The Reservation
Years (Santa Fe: School o f American Research Press, 1986), 33-34; Edward H. Spicer, Cycles o f Conquest:
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and told him that medicine men have no supernatural power. They are merely charlatans,
he assured"his son. To his death Ganado Mucho remained firm. Many Horses listened to
his father, and when confronted with a prophet in his own time, acted accordingly.
Perhaps he was chagrined by the loss of his fortune. In any case, in death his father
convinced him to associate prophets and medicine men with witchcraft."
When the Ghost Dance swept across the Great Plains and elsewhere in the West,
preaching the immanent elimination of the white man and the return of the Buffalo, it
also had a brief life on the Navajo reservation, although manifested in different form. In
1890, Nnazi, a Navajo prophet and medicine man, preached to the Navajo that they had
fallen out of harmony with their old customs and traditions. And because of this their
grass had gone bad and their herds were diminishing in number. Drought plagued the
reservation because of Navajo apostasy. Nnazi made a pilgrimage to the sacred San
Francisco Mountains where Changing Woman revealed this to Nnazi. After consulting
with Changing Woman, he was transported to the middle of the ocean where he met with
White Shell Woman. She confirmed that the drought and bad grass were punishment for
abandoning old ways and “forgetting about the gods of their fathers.”
Woman chose Nnazi to lead his people back to harmony.

White Shell

After returning from the

mountains, Nnazi told his story and he gained a following among the Navajo. Many
people saw the bad grass around them and their lean herds and took Nnazi’s words for
the truth. He began to create quite a stir. Additionally, during 1890, an outbreak of a
The Impaci o f Spain, Mexico, an d ihe ihtiies Siuies an the Indians o f the Scmihwesi, i 5 3 5-i960 (Tucson;
Univ. o f Arizona Press, 1962), 221.
^ The details o f this story com e from Leopold Osterman to William Henry Holmes, Bureau of/American
Ethnology (BAE), Letters Received (LR), National Anthropological .Archives (N A A ), Smithsonian
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throat disease resembling diphtheria killed 800 Navajos, possibly adding to the troubles
OR the reserv ation. Clearly something was wrong in the Navajo world. ^
Many Horses soon heard of Nnazi and having been well trained by his father took
him for a fake, or perhaps a witch He confronted Nnazi and asked him for proof of his
meeting with White Shell Woman. Nnazi could produce nothing tangible.

The only

evidence he could offer was the obviously denuded range. Many Horses branded him a
liar and a schemer only out for power and personal gain. He said that if he truly did meet
with White Shell Woman, then she, too, was a liar. The reason the grass is so bad—
Many Horses would at least admit that—was because the Navajo had larger herds and
thev had eaten all the erass. The Navaio had done nothing wrong. Manv Horses ignored
the issue of apostasy and put it all down to more animals.
The story is instructive, but must be read with caution. Leopold Osterman, the
man who recorded the story, had great respect for both Many Horses and his father. He
marveled at their keen intelligence. But what he seemed to like most in Ganado Mucho
and his son were their progressive values. Medicine men and prophets could not fool
them. They were men o f sound mind and both had led their people away from belief in
the superstitions of witchcraft. Osterman took down faithfully what each man told him
And he took for truth Many Horses’ story. Clearly, Nnazi was a false prophet who only
sought the approval of his people. Osterman tells us, in what is clearly his voice and not
Many Horses’, that Nnazi saw in the fervor over the Ghost Dance an “opportunity of
gaining prestige and profit.” Many Horses’ possessed nobler goals. He would take no
Institution (SI), ‘■Recollections o f L>ine Tsosi and other Navajo leaders,” 24 June 1907 The information is
taken from interviews done with various leaders o f the Navajos and their reflections on their lives.
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part in believing that the current drought and bad grass was any sort of retribution on the
part of the holy people for Navajo lapses in faith. On the contrary, he knew exactly what
it was: too many animals.
But Osterman concedes that Nnazi did indeed gain a following.

Nnazi's

followers’ faith in Nnazi’s story was spawned by the obvious condition of the grass and
the herds. As before, when Ganado Mucho ran witches off the reservation, there was
genuine trouble

When Ganado Mucho took care of witches in his time it was in

conjunction with increased raiding activity.

The delicate peace with whites was

threatened. Witchcraft only added to an already tense situation on the reservation. In
1890, when the son mirrored the father’s behavior, there was also real trouble. The range
was in dire shape. After many years of low rainfall and increased gullying, the increase
in sheep was finally taking its toll. And the Navajo could see that something was amiss.
Figuring out just how the Navajo dealt with the problem is hard to do. Records of their
reactions to the environmental crisis are few. But the above story does provide us with a
small window into the Navajo reaction to a very real problem. It was a problem that
some Navajo ascribed to failing out of balance with their religious life. Others, like
Many Horses, blamed the situation on too many sheep. Indian Agents did not know what
to make of the disaster. Most took the low rainfall of the 1880s and 90s as normal.
Although they could see that there was a problem, they did not think the conditions
anomalous.
But whatever the cause of the drought and the resultant poor condition of the
range, it was obvious to Navajos and whites alike that there was a problem.
^ Annual Rep<Mt o f the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs, Washington, D C

White

Government Printing Office,
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efforts at confronting the problem of the drought had proved fruitless, and in some
Navajo circles the drought caused a crisis of faith. Ad hoc reclamation efforts on the
Navajo reservation had done little to stem the effects of low rainfall. Before 1890, the
Indian Service put little effort into waterworks projects on the Navajo reservation. After
1890, when the drought really began to take its toll, the Indian Service was forced to
examine the situation on the reservation critically. But inertia and concerns elsewhere
led the Indian Service to neglect the Navajo reservation for much of the 1890s. Only
after the turn of the century did large-scale projects get serious consideration.
As the final two decades of the nineteenth century wore on the effects of the
drought discussed in the last chapter began to take their toll on the Colorado Plateau.
Indian Agents moved into the region and found themselves confronted with a parched
landscape. Securing water for the Navajo became a primary concern. But they did not
understand—how could they have?—that the region was undergoing a millennial drought
and their feeble attempts to control water would ultimately fail. By the 1890s, several
projects had been tried, none had been successful.

The 1890s were a decade of

reconnaissance. The U.S. Army surveyed Navajo reservation in 1889 and 1892, scouting
for water and future reclamation possibilities.
When the Indian Agents first arrived on the Colorado Plateau they approached
irrigation with aplomb.

Building a series of flumes, diversion ditches, or dams on

virtually any type of stream or in any narrow canyon was widely held to be an easy task.
The fruits o f their labor would be Indians who could farm for the market, and at the very
least for subsistence.

D.M. Riordan, the agent at Fort Defiance, on the Navajo

1890, 161, (Hereafter cited as ARCIA and the year.)
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Reservation, wrote, in 1883, that he was fervently trying to “make a garden spot of one of
the dreariest places on the planet...[which would] move to lift up the Indians here (in a
material way)."'* But there was little or no systematic plan; the agents were not engineers
and were newcomers who stayed too little time in the country to get to know it. The
same mistakes were repeated year after year as the revolving door ushered in and out one
agent after another.^
In these early days of irrigation development very little money from the annual
appropriations of the Indian Service was available for waterworks. Irrigation had not yet
become a permanent feature of the Indian Service’s annual budget and would not for
another ten years. At this point, irrigation development was done on a case by case basis
where Agents saw fit to attempt reclamation. Because irrigation did not yet have the
appeal that it later would have the Indian Service was reluctant to spend money on
projects that had potential for failure.

The federal government was not yet in the

business of reclamation and was thus skeptical of its benefits.

Agents interested in

irrigation, hoping to assuage the fears of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, contended
that they could irrigate plenty of land for little expense.

However, due to their

inexperience Agents made mistakes both in reading Indians and the land which led to the
waste of money and energy.

* D.M . Riordan to Secretary o f the Interior, 12 May 1883, #9378, B ox 138, Letters Received (LR), RG 75,
NA; the first money allocated for water development on Indian land was in 1867 for the Colorado River
reservation, Janet McDonnell, The Dispossession o f the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1991), 71.
^ Underhill, The Navajo, 169; for the bungling efforts o f the Indian Irrigation Division o f the Indian Service
see Donald J. Pisani, “Nationalizing the Waters,” “Uneasy Allies; The Reclamation Service and the Indian
Office,” Chapter 7.
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The Navajo reservation was one of the first places that the Indian Service
attempted reclamation. In the 1880s, agents worked hard on several projects. But they
met with little success. The first was D.M. Riordan. He assured the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs that “there are a number of places on the [Navajo] reservation where an
expenditure of a few hundred dollars would render large tracts available for farming in
the Indian manner.” He warned that this must be done soon, however, because gullying
had cut away valuable farm land, leaving much of the area around Fort Defiance a “sandy
waste.” If, however, he could get started right away he was confident that whatever he
built would last for all time and provide such excellent results that the fears of the
Commissioner of Indian would be put to rest. Too, Riordan requested that the Indian
Service send a man out to inspect the reservation for other waterworks projects. He was
optimistic about the possibilities of irrigation on the reservation and eager to get
reclamation underway.^
Things started to go wrong almost immediately and it became clear that more
than a few hundred dollars was necessary to build waterworks. The streambed in front of
the schoolhouse at Fort Defiance, Riordan's original hope for a water source, had been
cut to a thirty five to forty foot deep arroyo.

Water could not reach as far as the

schoolhouse; it all sunk into the sand far upstream. Where once Navajos cultivated fields
was now sand deposited far down stream. The arroyo had become so entrenched that it

^ D M . Riordan to CIA, 23 April 1883, #8080, B ox 135, LR, RG 75, NA; Secretary o f the Interior to D M .
Riordan, 3 May 1883, #8259, B ox 136, LR, RG 75,NA. The literature on gullying in the Southwest is best
reviewed in Tuan, “N ew M exican Gullies”; also see William Denevan, “Livestock Numbers in Nineteenth
Century N ew M exico, and the Problem o f Gullying in the Southwest,” Annals o f the Association o f
Americatt Geographers 57 (1967): 691-703; and Luna L eopold’s examination o f the literature on
exploration in the Southwest as a tool for tracking vegetation change is quite useftil, “Vegetation o f
Southwest Watersheds in the Nineteenth Century,” Geography Review 41(1951): 295-316.
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had eaten the surrounding fields. Riordan quickly shifted gears. After several scouting
trips he settled on a spot a mile up from the agency headquarters in Bonita Canyon. He
would let gravity deliver the water to the school. But the narrow canyon he intended to
dam carried through it a stream so powerful that after a rain it “carried all the solid
matter that water can.” Riordan did not seem to consider that this silt choked stream, the
one that cut the arroyo in front of the school in the first place, could not be held back by
the simple earth and log structure that he planned to build. Nevertheless, he estimated
that he would have the dam up and working by July, 1883, in time to collect water from
the rains of the monsoon season.^
As Riordan explored the canyons around Fort Defiance in April and May,
Navajos who had been in the foothills with their flocks moved back into the valleys to get
ready to plant. When the full moon of May came and the leafing of the aspens in the
mountains, it was time to start farming. Around Fort Defiance, when Pleiades appeared
in the night sky it was time to go to the fields and the natani, or local headman, declared
it time to plant. During early June the Navajo needed to be in their fields to plant beans,
squash, com, and muskmelons and watermelons. By the time warm weather set in stores
from the winter were usually running low. It was imperative that they begin the annual
planting. The Navajo had to have their crops planted by the beginning of July if they
were to have a good harvest for the year. The only rain that they could rely on, in most
years, came in July and August, thus if they did not have their com planted by early July
they courted disaster.*

^ D M . Riordan to th« Secretary o f the Interior, 12 May 1883, #9378, B ox 138, LR, RG 75, NA.
* W.W. Hill, The Agricultural an d Hunting Methods o f the Navajo Indians, Yale University Publications in
Anthropology (N ew Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1938), 17, 26. Using Hill’s ethnography seem s appropriate
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Riordan had not counted on any of this, and, thus, by June of 1883 he was not so
sanguine. Frustration set in because he did not understand that the exigencies of living in
the desert demanded that the Navajo get to work on their crops. To his mind, if the dam
was built they would not have to rely on the capricious climate. But to the Navajo, the
climate was anything but unpredictable. Indeed, success in agriculture was based on a
strong command of the ritual surrounding it. The particulars of the climate any given
year were far less important than the precise knowledge of ritual surrounding agriculture.
The predictability and faithful application of ritual would insure a good crop. Clearly,
then, the dam was far less important to the Navajo than it was to Riordan.

But the

Navajo were Riordan’s labor force and he had not counted on them being unavailable for
work until mid-July. After all, he had not spent a summer in Navajo country yet. He was
forced to wait.^
The Navajos belief that proper application of ritual would insure a good crop goes
a long way to describe the crisis of 1890. Naturally, if they experienced year after year of
poor crops and low rainfall, calling into question their faith would be a consequence of
the drought. Seen in this light, Riordan’s efforts at dam building would have little effect
on the Navajo if they believed that command of water was based on command of ritual.
The permanent structure that Riordan wanted to build made no sense in a view of the
world that was cyclic. Permanence, in the form of the dam, was arrogance. On a ritual
level, the dam would subvert the annual agricultural rituals; on a more practical.
in this case because many o f his informants were older men and wom en alive and well during the period in
question. His monograph does not discuss the ages o f his informants, but his notes at the National
Anthropological Archives at the Smithsonian do provide this information. The Navajo did not m ove as a
tribe, but rather as dispersed, discrete, clan based groups. The movement that I am describing occurred all
over Navajoland; my description is something o f a composite.
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everyday level, it made no sense. Floods would wash any dam out that could be built
with present technology.

Thus, the construction of a permanent dam was probably

thought of a foolishness by the Navajo, if they gave Riordan s efforts any thought all. In
any case, when Riordan turned to the Navajo to help him build the dam, they instead
went to their fields.
At the beginning of July, Riordan’s plans took a series of blows. The dam had to
be moved because Riordan mistakenly chose to build the dam on a base of quicksand.
He found the ruins of several other dams and was determined that his would not meet the
same fate. He soon located a spot further upstream. He envisioned a dam “forty two feet
high when finished and if it stands one freshet will last as long as the Navajo tribe does.”
(If Riordan’s prediction had been true they would have been doomed.) His estimate for
the project climbed to $6,300, and he now hoped to have the dam ready for next season.
But in the beginning of August, a flood raged through the narrow canyon, and washed
away Riordan’s efforts, and probably enlarged the arroyo in front of the school. He asked
for more money. Thus, between the spring and summer, the cost of the dam skyrocketed
from a few hundred dollars to over $9,000.*®
That autumn the dam fell further into disrepair. In September, when the Navajo
needed to harvest their com all else became secondary. And at the beginning o f the new
year, in October, food storage began in earnest. Harvesting was over, now it was time to
get ready for the winter. Riordan, again, lost the bulk of his labor force. Flooding ruined
the work in February, and by spring the dam was in a shambles. Riordan tried his best to

^ Hill, 52; D M Riordan to the Secretary o f the Interior, 15 June 1883, #10747, B ox 141, LR, RG 75, NA.
D M. Riordan to C IA 3 July 1883, #12533, B ox 145, LR, RG 75, NA; D M Riordan to C I A 27
September 1883, #18191, B ox 157, RG 75, NA.
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remain hopeful, but had a hard time masking his disappointment. Moreover, he was
worried that if the school at Fort Defiance did not have a clean supply of water soon, one
of the Navajo children would die.

Whether he was overstating the urgency of the

problem or not, I cannot say. What he was concerned with, however, was that if anyone
perished in one of the school buildings then the Navajo would not go near it for fear of
the spirit of the dead. Riordan realized that if he did not accommodate the Navajo’s
belief system his life would be made that much harder. To a large extent the agent had to
live on Navajo terms. After almost two years on the reservation, Riordan was finally
starting to realize this. ' '
D M. Riordan lasted only a few months longer on the reservation. He tendered
his resignation that summer and left.

It is easy to be critical of Riordan; his many

mistakes make him an easy target. But he oversaw a massive territory and got little help
with the work at hand. He lived in squalor at Fort Defiance. He performed his job with
unflagging dedication until the pressures of overseeing such a massive reservation
became too much. Herbert Welsh, head of the Indian Rights Association, called Riordan
“one of the most valuable officers employed in the Indian Service. He was a model
Indian Agent, possessing qualities rarely united in one man.” Welsh’s comments are
valuable because he was a well respected and influential shaper of Indian policy and
reform in the late nineteenth century. To him, Riordan’s case was simply emblematic of
the problem across the entire reservation system. “The Indian Agent is the pivot of the
Indian problem.

Upon him more than upon any one man rests the solution of the

” D M Riordan to CIA, 21 January 1884, #2017 and #2018, B ox 173, LR, RG 75, NA; D M. Riordan to
CIA, 10 March 1884, #4865, B ox 179, LR, RG 75, NA; D M Riordan to CIA, 10 April 1884, #7384, B ox
185, L R RG 75, NA.
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question.” By forcing men such as Riordan out of the Indian Service—by having them
live in horrid conditions and oversee vast territories alone—the Indians were the real
losers, according to Welsh. But the ill conceived efforts of men like Riordan insured that
the Indian Service, for the time being, had little influence over the Navajo. One man
could not affect much change among thousands of Indians. But Welsh’s concerns were
well founded. Riordan did not get much institutional support for his efforts, and, as we
shall see, he was not the last agent to leave the Navajo reservation after only a short
time,
John Bowman arrived in the summer of 1884 and started the cycle anew.
Bowman, despite great plans for developing waterworks projects, lasted less than two
years and saw none of his plans come to fruition. Like Riordan, Bowman thought the
Navajo a strong, deserving people.

He advocated the allocation of large amounts of

money to be spent on developing water on the reservation. “These Indians are certainly
the most deserving [in the region], both on account of previous good behavior, as well as
their recent efforts towards helping themselves and advancing toward civilization. This
tribe is now in the right mood and condition to make a long stride in the right direction.”
If the Navajo could make one crucial evolutionary leap, the long stride, they would be fit
to operate in the white world. Riordan had wanted to induce in the Navajo the spirit of
competition in order that it might inspire in them a love of personal gain. Likewise,
Bowman wanted to spend $20,000 on irrigation projects to develop individual
farmsteads.

The long stride that each man wanted the Navajo to make was the one

toward love of personal property so cherished in white society. Bowman thought, like

Herbert Welsh, “Report o f a V isit,. . 1 2 .
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many of his contemporaries, that Indians could be made over into whites in short order.
He knew that it would be a lot of work. But it appeared that Bowman had not learned a
thing from Riordan’s failures when he wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the
best way to hold back water and build reservoirs was by ' erecting slight dams with plow
and scraper, across some canyon or arroyo ’’ He soon learned that the slight dams he
envisioned would be washed away by the first flood; what had not worked for Riordan
would not work for him. Ironically, he conceded that a like number of white men would
have a hard time wresting a living from this barren land.’^
Bowman was but a blip in Navajo history, but he represents a strain of thought
that was prevalent among Indian Agents of the time. He believed that the Navajo were
essentially a redeemable people. His attitude is representative of the optimism of the era.
But Bowman, and his failures at reclamation also bear out the Indian Service’s continued
reluctance to invest in waterworks.
Almost like clockwork, by the summer of 1886 there was a new agent, Samuel S.
Patterson. Without fail, he set about to see what he could do about securing water for the
Navajos. Patterson was the first Agent, at least explicitly, to attempt to use irrigation as
social engineering.

To be sure, both Riordan and Bowman before him advocated

sedentary agriculture and wanted to instill a respect for private property, but neither were
as clear as Patterson in their reasoning.
Patterson banked on the hope that by developing springs the Navajo would stay
close to the reservation. Reasoning that it would be better to remain in one place with

D M Riordan to CIA, 27 September 1 8 8 3 ,, #18193, B ox 157, LR, RG 75, NA; John Bowman to CIA, 26
August 1884, #16714, B ox 205, LR, RG 75, NA; John H. Bowman to C IA 10 October 1884, B ox 211,
LR, RG 75, NA; for the redeeming qualities o f private property see, Hoxie, A Final Promise. 19.
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permanent water than to wander about in search of springs, Patterson sought to shift the
Navajos’ annual pattern of summering and wintering in different parts of their homeland.
He wanted them to stay on the reservation. He concluded that, “the matter of scarcity of
water in the summer and pasture in the winter is one cause of these Indians shifting about
so much instead of having more permanent dwelling places as would seem better for
them.” Oddly enough he was right. The Navajo did shift from place to place as the
limits of a particular locale were stretched, or as the season demanded it. But it was not
aimless wandering. The Navajo did hot simply pack up at any given movement and sniff
out the country for water. (Indeed, in places around Lukachkai and in the Chinle Valley,
most Navajo practiced sedentary agriculture, only placing secondary interest in stock
raising.) When the Navajo new year began in October and the harvesting was completed,
pinon nut gathering began as did the move to foothills to be near wood for the winter.
Following this, depending on how early the winter set in, the Navajo would then move
away from their fields to the winter hogans. The men would then leave to deer hunt,
usually toward the beginning of November.

They had good reason not to remain

permanently in one location. Resources were scattered about Navajo country.
But Agents like Patterson saw their mobility as aimless wandering.

Despite

recognizing their reasons for moving—the matter of scarcity of water in the summer and
pasture in the winter—he wanted them to stay put within the legal confines of the
reservation. That appears to have been a goal equal to the respect for private property.
The Navajo needed to learn how to respect the boundaries of the reservation. But as long

*'* Hill, 15-16; Samuel S. Patterson to CIA, 9 August 1886, #21697, B ox 328, LR, RG 75, NA; Patterson to
CIA, I September 1886 and 2 September 1886, #23926 and #23927, B ox 335, LR, RG 75, NA; White
“Navajo Econom y and Culture,” in The Roots o f Dependency.
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as their herds continued to increase, and the drought continued to desiccate the land, the
Navajo could not remain settled for the entire year in one place

The debate over the

perceived nomadic nature o f the Navajo would he of great import in the coming years,
Obser/ers of the Navajo continued to label them nomads even as they remarked on the
importance of agriculture on the reser\'ation.
This was always the fatal mistake of the water planners in these early days: they
recognized that the Colorado Plateau was semi-arid country', but they could not see that
the Navajo had developed, over the centuries, strategies to deal with their environment.
The agents’ plans to dam washes they found dry in the late spring and early summer, but
that became torrents of rock and mud and water whenever rain or snowmelt coursed their
way through them, were fatally naïve and based on scant experience in the region. The
Navajo practiced floodwater farming where it was practical to do so, but never believed
in the folly of building permanent structures.

W.H. Code, twenty years later,

characterized the work at Fort Defiance as a failure. He contended that Fort Defiance
was the “point where probably more money has been expended in temporary/ work with
less to show for it, than at any other school I have visited in the west.” Strong words
indeed from the chief engineer.'^
These three agents of the 1880s were sure that the Navajo were quite capable of
evolving into modems. They believed in the innate ability of the Navajo to progress;
they did not buy into rigid racial determinism, but rather they were part of a new
generation of reformers and agents who believed that through good works and example,
Indians would survive and flourish into the next centuiy'. But they did not last very long
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and were able to affect little change. Too, the Indian Service was not yet ready to put
such faith in waterworks projects, and, thus, they did not have the institutional support
they needed. Conversion to the gospel of irrigation would have to wait until close to the
next century. The Indian Service still considered these early projects ones done on a
local scale and not part of a national plan.
The experiences of the agents in the 1880s, to an extent, discouraged much
development in the nineties. But agents on the Colorado Plateau still batted about the
possibilities of irrigation development in earnest. In 1889 the army sent Lt. John M.
Stotsenburg out to Navajo country.

Stotsenburg was detailed to the reservation to

perform a reconnaissance mission in search of water. His lengthy report, written after
more than two months spent in the saddle wandering the Navajo backcountry, was rich in
detail regarding current Navajo farming practices as well as future possibilities.
Stotsenburg, like others before him and many after him, concluded that the
Navajo were “stock raisers and to secure grass they wander about a good deal.” He went
on, “In prosecuting the work 1 have learned that it is a matter o f doubt whether the
Navajo Indians would ever live on or farm the land after water for irrigation and stock
was improved. It being merely a matter of fancy with them where they live and how long
they will sojourn t h e r e . D e s p i t e his reluctance to believe in their ability to stick with
agriculture, he visited nineteen locations across Navajo country and found farms at every

W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 6 September 1905, B ox 109, General Correspondence (GC),
Irrigation Division (ID), Series 653, RG 75, NA.
John M. Stotsenburg to the Adjutant General, Department o f Arizona, 7 April 1889, 20 April 1889, and 6
July 1889, B o x 209, SC 190, RG 75, NA. These several different versions o f this report at the National
Archives all appear to have the same contents. They appear to be copies o f the original from April o f 1889
1 am using contemporary spelling o f names o f places and people unless they appear in quotations, in which
case I retain the original spelling.
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one.

Too, he suggested developing water in places where Navajos had settled, “not

because these were always considered the best but because several families had chosen
these places as their homes and had farans or had done some work on them. They will
work these place more willingly than elsewhere.” Clearly Stotsenberg could see that the
Navajo did not merely wander the country; they did establish permanent, albeit seasonal,
homes.
What clouded his vision, and led him to determine that the Navajo were only
pastoralists, was the amount o f cultivated land. That is, where the Navajo had eighty
acres under cultivation, Stotsenburg dreamed of eight hundred. Too, the Navajo did not
sell the produce from their farms, like they sold the wool from their sheep. His sights
were set on the market, while the Navajo were content with a mixed subsistence
economy of farming and stock raising.*’
The Stotsenburg report is fascinating and should be considered in brief detail. It
is the first of its kind: a report solely for the purpose of investigating irrigation
possibilities. It provides insight into not only Navajo farming, but white views on Navajo
life,

Stotsenburg, on the one hand, was a keen observer, but on the other, he was,

unsurprisingly, myopic.

For example, Stotsenburg characterized the Navajos that he

encountered as unwilling to fool with permanent irrigation works. They were too lazy,
he said, and unwilling to work. They lacked the industry to undertake such projects.
But, without a hint of irony, he advised in his report against permanent irrigation works
because “they would either wash out in a freshet or fill up [with silt] as they did at
Washington Pass or Fort Defiance.” Laziness was not the concern; Stotsenburg warned
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the government against wasting money on futile projects. Where the government would
be acting out of efficiency, the Navajo were merely lazy.’**
Where and when necessary, the Navajo had practiced flood water irrigation for
centuries. In the Navajo origin story, after First Man and First Woman peopled the earth,
their descendants began to farm utilizing a dam and an irrigation ditch. And evidence
points to their prevalence across Navajo country. Indeed, it should come as no surprise
that some form of water diversion would be needed in order to wrest a living in a
semiarid landscape. Thus, when Stotsenburg claimed that the Navajo ‘have, as a rule,
little or no idea of irrigation,” his comments took on a specious tone.’^
But the Navajo may have been taking the agents for fools. His report implies,
though he did not know it, that the Navajo took advantage of the agents.

After

advocating simple, impermanent structures—brush dams of the sort that the Navajo
clearly knew how to use— Stotsenburg laments the fact that the Navajo were not
educated in the ways of taking care of such structures. Whenever one threatened to give
way all one had to do was throw a shovel full o f dirt in and it was fixed, so he claimed.
But the Navajo could not even do that. They preferred to sit back and watch the hard
work of the agent go to waste, and then ride “fifty to a hundred miles to tell the Agent.”
The agent, of course, was then compelled to come and rescue the poor Navajos who
could not even use a shovel properly. Perhaps the agent, feeling sorry for Indians who

ibid.
ihtd.
19

On the Origin story see, Washington Matthews, Navajo Legends (Boston: Houhgton and Mifflin, 1897,
Kraus Reprint ed., 1969), 70; on flood water farming and pre-historic and historic irrigation see, Kirk Bryan,
“Flood Water Farming,” Geographical Review 19(1925):444-456, Esther Goidffank, “Irrigation Agriculture
and Navaho Community Leadership: Case Material on Environment and Culture,” American Anthropologist
47(1945); 267; Hill, 24-25; quote from Stotsenburg report.
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could not master such a simple operation, would bring food from one of the trading posts
on the reservation.
Stotsenburg posed the obvious question; If they could not get a grasp o f the
concept behind a brush dam, then how could they be expected to be responsible for
anything more elaborate or permanent? O f course, the evidence does not prove the point,
but were the Navajo consciously playing dumb—surely they could fix a brush dam—just
to waste the time of the agent? To what end would they try and play the agent in such a
way? It does seem odd that rather than fix a structure with which they were surely
familiar they would let it be washed away. It is possible that they did this merely to irk
the agent. A more likely answer is that the small brush dams were inadequate or that
they were built in areas Navajos did not favor for cultivation, thus they saw no reason to
maintain them. Of course, this is difficult to prove. But Stotsenburg gave the lie to his
own account.

When inspecting the Chinle Valley, he advised against trying to dam

Chinle creek with anything resembling a permanent structure.

The creek shifted its

course too much, thus making such a project impossible. Stotsenburg, again with no
irony, suggested that the preferred method of taking advantage of the water would be
with impermanent brush or dirt dams “as the Navajo do when they want water”!
Obviously, then, the Navajo were familiar with irrigation.
This is not just a simple case of nineteenth century ethnocentrism. Stotsenburg's
account should not be read as simply the account of one more misguided white man
trying to do his best for the Indian. To be sure, it was that. But more importantly, it is
instructive of Stotsenburg's utter blindness, and by association the blindness of the Indian
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Service. With no sense o f contradiction or irony, Stotsenburg, in one instance, dismisses
the Navajo as unable to grasp the intricacies of irrigation, but then suggests that in
developing waterworks that the Indian Service follow the lead of the Navajo. Again, as
when Peterson realized that the N a v a jo country was conducive to transhumance—surely
not his word—and that the Navajo therefore had good reason to move around,
Stotsenburg, too, could see that the Navajo had grasped how to utilize water in the desert.
Both men admitted, Stotsenburg through his own contradictions, that the Navajo were
indeed capable. But there was such an impenetrable wall of misunderstanding between
them that nothing effective could be done.

If in fact the Navajo were purposefully

fooling the agents, and to me it seems likely they were, they were complicit in this
morass of misunderstanding.

For the time being, the size of the reservation—

Stotsenburg, by his own admission, only saw a quarter of it—the lack of personnel, and
the reluctance of the Indian Service to embark on any large-scale reclamation plans, kept
waterworks projects to a minimum.

The agent at Fort Defiance, C.E. Vandever,

approved of the Stotsenburg report, only adding that he knew that even more families
farmed on the reservation than Stotsenburg reported. But, nevertheless, Vandever felt
that Stotsenburg was thoroughly qualified for the work and was pleased that the “[Indian]
Department has chosen so efficient a gentlemen to perform this much needed and
laborious task.” ^'
Stotsenburg was not alone in his vision to increase Navajo cultivation. In 1891
John Wesley Powell, at the time heading both the Bureau of Ethnology and the U.S.
Geological Survey, identified no less than 250,000 acres of potentially irrigable land in
20

Ib id
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the Chinle Valley alone, and in the northern part of the Reservation, along the San Juan
River, he proclaimed that 35,000 acres was irrigable land. Powell was enthusiastic about
the possibilities for reclamation on the Navajo Reservation. He was confident that,
opportunities for water storage and irrigation are to be found in numerous
places. The topography of the country throughout is favorable to the location of
reservoirs among the head-waters of the various streams ...All of these canyons
open out ultimately on broad plains and valleys, covered with rich deep soil,
which is at present covered with a dense growth of sage brush giving evidence of
its fertility .- The reservoirs can usually be constructed at comparatively little cost,
as they will be located in canyons, and will usually require dams o f but moderate
length, the rock for the construction of which can be blasted out of the sides of
the canyons at the dam sites."
But Powell’s enthusiasm for developing the San Juan River area and others on the
reservation waned when he learned that only $10,000 had been appropriated for irrigation
in 1891.

That would not be sufficient to build the kind of waterworks that Powell

envisioned; only a large dam could hold back the San Juan River and make it a profitable
venture.

All the waterworks that Powell envisioned for the reservation were large

projects, just the type that the Indian Service was not prepared to undertake. Powell was
familiar with the Stotsenburg report and favored his approach: the development of small,
local projects. If there was not the will or the money really to reclaim the reservation,
then small works would have to do for the time being."^
This kind o f vision for the San Juan River country was not limited to Powell. By
the time Powell weighed in on the idea o f reclaiming the San Juan, the Indian Service
had hired James Francis as an Additional Farmer. Francis, and others in his position
across the West, oversaw farming in select farming districts, rather than overseeing an

C.E. Vandever to CIA, 3 May 1889, #12367, B ox #209, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
John W esley Powell to CIA, 6 February 1891, 11 Novem ber 1891, #4962, B ox 209, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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entire reservation. Francis was a little less grandiose than Powell, but he, too, believed
that farming would redeem Indians.

Francis was convinced that the construction of

waterworks on the reservation would forever end nomadic ways,^"^
Visions like those of Francis and Powell would have to wait until the twentieth
century, when the will existed to attempt large-scale projects. Throughout the remainder
of the 1890s, agents concerned themselves with only a few minor irrigation projects.
They mostly fretted over what to do with off-reservation Navajos. Turning Navajos into
farmers took a backseat to solving the range problem. However, this only amounted to so
much talk.

During the nineties grass became scarcer and scarcer as drought and

increases in population—Navajo, Anglo, and animal—began to take their toll. As whites
moved into the area in ever greater numbers, Navajos living on the public domain
became something of a nuisance and the source o f many complaints. Developing water,
then, became a way to tiy to keep the Navajo on the reservation. Again, the lack of a
cohesive policy kept waterworks projects from ever really going beyond impotent efforts.
Still primarily considered wandering nomads, the Navajos who lived off the
reservation, in particular, needed to be corralled along with their sheep. In 1890, the
Indian Office instructed C.E. Vandever that his primary duty was to “immediately take
energetic and proper steps to keep the Indians... within the limits of the reservation and to
return roving Indians to the reservation.” Vandever did not need to be told of the friction
developing between the white cattlemen and the Navajo; he was fully aware of the
potential for a violent clash. He was largely sympathetic to the plight of the Navajo and

” C.E. Vandever, Indian Agent to CIA, 3 May 1889, RG 75,19A, SC 190, #12367, B ox 209; John W esley
Powell to the Secretary o f the Interior, 24 November 1891, RG 75, NA, SC 190, #42406, B ox 209
James Francis, Additional Farmer to CIA, 29 December 1891, RG 75, SC 190, NA, #1193, B ox 209.
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had little tolerance for cowboys whom he termed “by-product[s] of civilization.” Despite
his disdain for the “bloodthirsty man midwives,” Vandever knew that something had to
be done. And, despite encouraging signs that the Navajo were developing respect for
private property and permanent homes, Vandever still worried that the task of making
them understand “our scheme of restricted land holding” would be near impossible.
Only if sufficient water could be developed would the Navajo remain on the reservation
and stave off the impending tempest.
The Indian Service began to see that irrigation might have possibilities on a large
scale.

In 1891, $200,000 was allocated for the Crow reservation and $30,000 for a

general water development fund. For the next several years the Indian Service allocated
between $30,000 and $40,000 for general projects, and, of course, maintenance and
continued construction on the large Crow project. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, T. J.
Morgan, supported the irrigation efforts.

But he realized that expert guidance was

necessary. “I am ... of the opinion that the money could be expended to better advantage,
if the appointment of a competent engineer to superintend the work were authorized by
law.” Although the Indian Service was beginning to be converted to the gospel of
irrigation, professionalization was still a long way off. But Morgan’s interest in irrigation
led to another survey o f the Navajo reservation, this time in 1892.^^ The U.S. Army still
led the effort. And, again, it was a reconnaissance mission; no work was done, just
information gathered concerning where irrigation and stock water development would be

“ ARCIA, 1890, 164-165; ARCIA, 1892, 125, 579; A M Stephen, “The Navajo,”

Anthropologist 6 (1893, old series), 349, 362.
“ Condition o f the Navajo Indian Country, 52™* Cong., 2'“* Sess., 1893, S. Ex. Doc. 68, Serial 3056, 1-50.
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profitable. Too, the continued drought had left the Navajo in worse condition than they
had been in years, according to the agent.
The crux of the matter was keeping the Navajo on the reservation. And water
development was the way to do it. Nomadic Indians were a menace; they were a danger
to both themselves and the grovsnng white population.

The Pueblo Agent even

complained about wandering Navajos. It seems that they were grazing on Zuni lands and
the Agent was worried about potential violence. Now, the Indian Agents on the ground,
and the Commissioner in Washington, both came to see that irrigation could greatly aid
their situation. Irrigation development would foster sedentary farming, and stock water
development would curtail seasonal movement in search o f water and grass.

The

redoubtable C.E. Vandever, ever optimistic, said that “this method would tend to cure the
roving habits of the Navajoes [sic] and advance them in civilization... If this tribe is to be
restrained within the reservation, all the portions available for agriculture must be made
productive.”^*
But tension always existed between those who wanted water developed solely for
stock and those who believed farming was best. Clearly, Vandever and James Francis,
the Additional Farmer, had faith in farming. In 1894, however, the Indian Service hired
its expert, an engineer from Staunton, Virginian, E C. Vincent. He agreed that farming
would work wonders for keeping the Navajo in one place, but owing to the topography of

” On the allocations see ARCIA, 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896; quote from ARCIA, 1892, 92;
on the drought and condition o f the Navajo see, ARCIA, 1893, 1894. But these reports should be taken
with a grain o f salt. C.E. Vandever w as replaced by E H Plummer in 1893, and Plummer had a wholly
different outlook on the friture o f the Navajo. Where Vandever saw progress, Plummer found backwardness
and hopelessness. T w o such varying impressions speak as much to actual condition o f the Navajo as they do
the suspect nature o f the agents’ reports.
ARCIA, 1892, 581; N S, Walpole to CIA, 22 Novem ber 1898, #53471,B ox 102, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
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the reservation it was a folly ever to think that much of the reservation was cultivable.
Despite his disbelief in fanning he did construct several reservoirs designed to irrigate
crop lands. Vincent’s reluctance to bank on farming came, again, from the common
perception that the Navajo were aimless wanderers. To Vincent, on the reservation for
just a year when he submitted his report, the Navajo were not cut out to be farmers. “He
inherits love o f leisure from his ancestors.
responsibility.

He wants neither care, work, nor

His easygoing, shepherd life is far more to his like than farming.”

Vincent went further to say that the nomadic life had caused much strife among the
Nav^o. He averred that their holding water sources in common for stock had led to a
“survival of the fittest” mentality
water for their sheep.

Only the strongest would get the proper amount of

And nomadic life, o f course, meant that the Navajo had no

permanent homes; home was merely a matter of where one found oneself at day’s end.^^
Vincent shared with agents in later years, as we shall see, a desire to increase
stock on the reservation. There was e n o u ^ water available, if it could be developed
properly, to insure the growth o f the herds. Farming was never going to work to any
great extent on the reservation, according to men like Vincent. But often the left hand
seemed not to know what the right hand was doing. In the same Annual Report, the
agent reported that, again, the Navajo had suffered terrible losses o f stock due to drought
and a particularly hard winter. He emphasized concentrating on farming; stock raising
was too mercurial an enterprise! According to the agent, Vincent was unfit for the task,
and the money that the Indian Service allocated for waterworks was going to waste. By

ARCIA, 1895, 25.
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the following year, 1896, E C. Vincent had been dismissed. And according to the agent,
the “benevolent designs o f Congress had not been accomplished.”^®
The above examples serve to illustrate the still very unprofessional manner in
which the agents and the Indian Service went about getting water for the Navajo. E C.
Vincent was hired finally to bring a modicum o f expertise to the enterprise, but he proved
unfit for the job. And conflicts existed between those who believed in farming as the
solution or further stocking o f the range. It really depended on the persuasion o f the
observer. Men like Vincent, a very recent transplant from the humid East, could not be
expected to understand the exigencies o f farming on the semiarid Colorado Plateau. To
him, livestock was the obvious solution in what to him appeared to be a sea of grass.
This caused immediate friction between him and the agent. Constant Williams, who
believed that farming could work.
Waterworks projects on the Navajo reservation during the last twenty years o f the
nineteenth century never got beyond this stage of ad-hoc development. Vincent, the first
professional to attack the problems, attempted to construct permanent dams at several
places on the reservation.

They met with the same fate as the earlier dams at Fort

Defiance. Freshets washed away permanent structures. As the century closed, little had
been accomplished on the reservation, save one thing: a greater sense of urgency
regarding water development. The severe drought was not over. The Indian Service’s
commitment to water development on the Colorado Plateau was not serious enough yet
to affect real change.

But with the new century, the Indian Service’s level of

commitment to irrigation deepened and a cadre of professional engineers emerged to try

ARCIA, 1895, 118; ARCIA, 1896, 112-113.
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to solve the problems o f water development on the Colorado Plateau.

The Indian

Service’s interest in irrigation did not, o f course, germinate in a vacuum. Throughout the
1890s and into the first years of the twentieth century, irrigation became a much talked
about solution for settling the arid W est

Irrigation could be employed to fulfill the

American destiny of spreading out over the entire country; new lands, heretofore going to
waste, could be made productive.

Irrigation was not only a way to redeem Indians,

making them productive members o f American society, but a way to redeem all of the
West. With the passage o f the Reclamation Act in 1902, the United States, on a national
level, committed itself to large-scale waterworks. And the Indian Service jumped on

board.^^
Navajos, too, needed convincing o f the sobering effects of civilization; they
needed to see that what the white man had in mind was, indeed, better than their life of
“wandering” the Colorado Plateau. But it would be hard to convince them of that at such
a distance from civilization. And one agent could not hope to prove to the Navajo the
benefits of white civilization. Additionally, white civilization at-largc needed to see that
Indians were still, on the cusp of the twentieth century, largely frozen in time. Indians,
since the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, had been trotted out by the government
and put on display. But by the 1890s the ^^actice was as much for the benefit of the
Indians as much as a show piece for white audiences. At the 1893 Columbian Exposition
in Chicago, Indians from tribes across the country, “displayed” by either the Indian

For the development o f irrigation ideology, albeit tw o disparate views, see, Donald Worster, Rivers o f
Empire: Water, Aridity, an d the Growth o f the American West (N ew York; Oxford Univ. Press, 1985), 1,
189; Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a D ivided West: Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848-1902
(Albuquerque: Univ. o f N ew M exico Press, 1992), 273-325. See the bibliography for contemporary
accounts o f the national irrigation movement.
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Service or the Bureau o f Ethnology, were examples of, respectively, assimilable peoples,
or examples of the country’s primitive past. The tension between the two representations
is worth noting because the Navajo fit perfectly into both constructions; they were, on the
t

one hand, frequently characterized as the most fit and able Indians, or vilified as raiders
and chastised for being wild, nomadic Indians.

Thus, they could be models of

assimilation or examples of the primordial past. In the twentieth century this tension
would have to be eased; one or the other interpretation would have to prevail.

The

country was ready to shed the skin o f the past and Indians who represented that past
needed to be shucked off with it.^^
The object lesson o f Chicago traveled a two-way street. White America could get
a glimpse of either Indians on their way to civilization or Indians from a time now,
thankfully, gone. But Indians, too, could see for themselves what white America was
like. Several Navajos went to the fair, at the expense of the Indian Rights Association, in
Hosteen Deete Sahghy’s words, “for the whites to see and [for the Navajos] to see the
whites.” The fair seemed to work the appropriate magic on the three Navajos from
whom we have accounts; they were singularly impressed with what they saw on their
journey. The white world was, indeed, better than the Navajo. All the way to Chicago
the Navajos could see that the “white people were taking care of the earth... .Look at our
country; we ought to be ashamed o f it. Look at the difference.” The white world was
managed for the benefit o f the people, Hosteen Bagota seemed to be saying, whereas the
Navajo world was laying in waste. And without doubt one lesson the trip was designed
to instill in the Navajo was the white way of farming.

As they traveled across the

Hoxie, S8-89.
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Midwest to Chicago the farms along the way impressed them, as did the amount of work
whites put into their farms.

‘They don’t lay around in the sun; they work all the

time. . The Indians looked to see how it is done; how the white people do the work. We
seen for all the Navajoes (sic].” Indeed,, they had. By all accounts, if we are to take these
testimonies literally, the Navajo had been convinced of the value o f white civilization.^^
In the early twentieth century, the Indian Service began to take reclamation on
Indian reservations seriously. But as they did so, the Navajo were not the only Indians on
the Colorado Plateau who were in need of waterworks. Their neighbors, the Zuni, long
neglected by the Indian Service, came under close scrutiny. Before exploring the parallel
history of Navajo and Zuni irrigation development, a brief examination of Zuni is in
order.

/VRCIA, 1894, 1044-1045. More than these three Navajos went to Chicago, but it is their testimonies that
w ere recorded.
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TRADITIONAL ZUNI AGRICULTURAL AREA
* 1VH5 by th« untvcrsiiy v( OkJthonia i'rcM

From Waffle Gardens to the Blackrock Dam: The Zuni Reservation, 18831900

From a distance of more than a century it is easy to look back in amusement at
agent Ben Thomas’s request for sixty dollars to sink a well on the Zuni reservation to
provide them with water enough to fulfill their needs.

The astigmatism that we

experience glancing back in time is probably less profound than the myopia Thomas
suffered as he observed the Zuni from a fair distance himself: the agent in those days was
stationed in Santa Fe and had little or no contact with the Zuni. It is likely that when
Thomas requested the money he had never set foot at Zuni. His vision o f what the Zuni
needed was clouded indeed. More realistic, but still way off the mark was the plan of the
teacher and missionary at Zuni, J.H. Wilson. Where the Zuni River narrows just north of
the main village, as it flows through black lava rocks, was the ideal spot for a dam,
Wilson thought. Wilson estimated that the dam could be up and running, built with local
supplies and cheap Indian labor, at a cost of eight hundred dollars. The reservoir that
would form behind the dam would supply water for 8000 acres of farm land and would
“render fertile and valuable a tract which otherwise is almost barren and useless.”
Perhaps the Zuni would then see the value in such projects and be encouraged to build
them on their own. As was the hope o f Indian agents in those days, they would lead by
example and the Indians would follow.

Additionally, the Zuni would have so much

leisure time when their dam and ditches were finally built that they could enjoy the
reservoir as an aquarium! Wilson’s enthusiasm was palpable. But he really did not know
what he was doing, nor did his “expert engineer,” Douglas Graham, the local trader. As

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66

o f 1883 the railroad had not yet reached Gallup, forty miles north of Zuni, and the project
was put on hold due to lack o f materials and labor. ‘
Throughout the late 1870s and the early 1880s, the boundaries of the Zuni
reservation were not entirely clear. Determining the needs of the Zuni-=hovv much land
would be adequate for farming and stock raising—was pressing business for the Indian
Service. The land grant that they had received from the Spanish was contested and white
settlers were moving into the region, threatening Zuni title. The Zuni’s water needs were
an important feature of the these discussions. The three villages that the Zuni tvent to
each year to farm were essential for their well being—they included the most reliable
water sources. Thus, keeping them part of Zuni land became an important feature of
working out the boundaries of the reservation.

But also important was developing

alternate sources of water. James Stevenson o f the U.S. Geological Survey, and husband
of Matilda Coxe Stevenson, recognized, too, that the black lava rocks were the ideal spot
for a dam

Developing a dam at this location would enable the Zuni to cultivate more

land near their “permanent” home of Zuni village. But Zuni village was not really a
permanent home; it was more o f religious center. The Zuni returned to the main village
each year for Shalako and to spend the winter. Developing a dam to curtail movement
between the villages would alter the Zuni’ annual schedule. But in these discussions
regarding the boundaries of the reservation, the dam remained merely an idea. No work
was undertaken to survey the site, much less begin construction. The ideas tossed about
regarding reclamation at Zuni in the period before 1900 bore no fruit. The spot that the

’ B.M . Thomas to CIA, 17 November 1882, #21085, B ox 109; 26 March 1883, #6033, B ox 130, LR, RG
75, NA; J.H. Wilson to B.M. Thomas, 26 March 1883, #6300, B ox 131, LR, RG 75, NA; B.M . Thomas to
CIA, 17 Apiil 1883, #7413, B ox 134, LR, RG 75, NA

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

dam would eventually go was picked, but this was a small achievement, indeed. The
Indian Service appeared eager to build a dam, but the will was not there.'
Not far to the northwest, D.M. Riordan was echoing Wilson’s and Thomas’s
enthusiasm at Fort Defiance. But like the projects at Fort Defiance, the Zuni dam was ill
fated from the start. The Indian Service was not yet willing to get in the business of
reclamation. At Zuni, serious discussion o f the dam would have to wait another fifteen
years.
After these stalled efforts, interest in reclamation projects at Zuni slacked off.
They did herd sheep, but never in the numbers that the N av^o did; thus the main concern
at Zuni was not keeping wandering nomads in place. On the contrary, the Zuni were
settled agriculturists who lived in permanent homes in four very distinct Pueblos—Zuni,
Ojo Pescado, Ojo Caliente, and Nutria. The nexus o f activity was Zuni, while the other
three served as seasonal agricultural villages. While at Navajo, agents would not readily
accept Navajo agriculture; at Zuni agriculture and irrigation went hand in hand and had
done so before the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. The most common
type was floodwater irrigation. The Zuni built check dams, diversionary dams, and small
mud walls around their fields, all in an effort to guide water from the intense summer
storms and run-off from snowmelt Around Nutria, Ojo Pescado, and Ojo Caliente, there
were permanent springs, and diversion ditches were constructed to direct water onto the
fields. A third method Of farming was also practiced: the waffle garden. Zuni women
constructed small, waffle like embattlements around individual plants to conserve water.

^ “Zuni Indian Reservation in N ew M exico and Arizona,” Ex. D oc . #11, 4 8 * C o n g , 2*** Sess., 1884, James
Stevenson to the Secretary o f the Interior, ? April 1884. This is a twenty-nine page collection o f letters and
executive orders referring to llie boundary problems on the reservation.
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This was normally done close by the Zuni River in order that water could easily be
brought up by hand and deposited on individual plants. In the large fields watered by
floodwater irrigation the Zimi grew com, while in the smaller waffle gardens, specialty'
crops like onions, peppers, squash, and pumpkins were cultivated. The Zuni laid in crops
for the coming year in order to prevent shortages.'
Throughout the 1880s and 90s, while the Indian Service worked furiously, but to
little avail at Navajo, the Zuni did not even have their own agent. And irrigation works
were not the first priority of the Indian Service.

But by the late 1890s irrigation

development was, again, considered; this time the idea was here to stay. Drought on the
Colorado Plateau forced the Indian Service to reconsider reclamation. The discussions
that took place in the late 90s on the Zuni reservation resembled those of the early 80s at
Fort Defiance. It was as if a loop tape had run its course ahd was being played again.
The Zuni, like the Navajo before them were now found wanting.

According to the

accounts o f the agents in the area and the Indian inspectors who came through the
reservation, the Zuni anxiously awaited a dam. “They are very poor and their means of
subsistence very limited, owing to the lack of water upon their lands....[T]hey are veiy
anxious to have their lands irrigated” noted Indian Inspector Duncan. Tire bulk of the
Zuni’s time was “taken up with prayer and offerings to the god of rain. This dam would
obviate all this distress.” The time was ripe to undertake such a project. Both Duncan

^ ARCIA, 1898, p. 211, “Report o f the Field matron in Zuni Pueblo”; Vorsila Bohrer, “Zuni Agriculture,”

E l Palacio 67(1960), 181-202; Bryan, “Flood-W ater Farming”, Frank Hamilton Cushing, Zuni Breadstuff
(N ew York: The H eye Foundation, M useum o f the American Indian, 1920); Matilda C oxe Stevenson, 'the
Zuni Indians, 23"* Annual Report o f the Bureau o f American Ethnology (Washington, D C GPO, 1915),
351-354; Karl A Wittfogel and Esther S. Goldfrank, "Some Aspects o f Pueblo M ythology and Society,”

Journal o f American Folklore .56('^), 21-22; T ,1 Ferguson and F Richard Hart A Zuni Atlas (Norman
Univ. o f Oklahoma Press, 1985), 37-39.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

and the agent for the Pueblo and Jicarilla Agency, N.S. Walpole, had heard rumors that a
dam had been discussed before, but for some reason had not been built.

Duncan

confessed to having no way o f finding out whether this was true or not, but he and
Walpole believed that $10,000 had already been allocated for a dam. O f course they
were referring to the ill fated dam discussed in the early 1880s at Zuni.'*
The dam at Zuni, which would become knows as the Blackrock Dam, was widely
discussed in the late 1890s, A C. Tonner, the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs, forwarded
Inspector Duncan’s report to the Secretary of the Interior and advised that another, more
detailed inspection be made o f the reservation. In 1899 Walter H. Graves was dispatched
to the Southwest to make a wide raging inspection o f many reservations and the water
conditions upon them In the report that Graves filed with the Secretary o f the Interior he
found all of the Pueblo Indians in dire shape; they were living on the farthest margin of
existence. San Ildefonso Pueblo had not been able to grow crops for the last few years
owing to old, decrepit ditches. They had been forced to sell “their crude pottery” and
take what work they could get. He found similar conditions at all the Pueblos. But Zuni,
with the largest population, was in the worst shape of all.^
Graves found the ceremonial life o f the Pueblos fascinating, and he blamed it, in
part, for their piteous conditions. The Pueblo Indians seemed to devote all of their time
to “supplicating or propitiating some of their innumerable Deities for rain or favorable

N .S. W alpole to CIA, 22 November 1898, #53471, B o x 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Report o f Inspector
Duncan in A C Tonner, CIA to the Secretary o f the Interior, December 12 1898, #50177, B ox 212, SC
190, RG 75, NA; B.M. Thomas to CIA, 17 April 1883, #7413, B ox 134, LR, RG 75, NA.
' Walter H. Graves to the Secretary o f the Interior, 24 Novem ber 1899, #57989, B o x 212, SC 190, RG 75,
NA.
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weather.” He hoped that the energy spent in their ceremonial pursuits could be redirected
to fruitful labor.
The time and effort consumed in the ceaseless and bewildering rites and
ceremonies o f these people—believed to be essential to secure the little moisture
that is necessaiy to pull through their meagre [sic] crops—if properly applied with
sufficient water for irrigating their lands, would produce enough to supply their
wants and more.^

The ceremonial schedule of the Pueblos, especially Zuni, became a constant source of
irritation and befuddlement for engineers and agents to come. Rain came each year, but
the quality of the rain was dependent on the “generosity o f the proper Deity,” according
to Graves. The rain might be too violent one year and come all at once, or be unevenly
distributed, but with a dam the generosity o f the gods would no longer be a concern.
But a dam could not replace religious ritual. The tension between ritual and work
thus became almost palpable. The ceremonial life o f the Zuni, designed in large part
around insuring sustenance through understanding and paying heed to the seasons of the
year, could not be subverted overnight. Where the inspectors and agents saw chaos and
disorder in ritual—a waste o f time and energy—the Zuni were trying to wrest order from
their world. Agents and engineers wanted to reorder the Zuni world, but in the disorder
of ritual, the Zunis possessed precious autonomy from the white world. In fact the dam,
per se, was not an issue with the Zuni, but attempts at altering religious life posed a real
affront. Indeed, Governor Chaves of Zuni said, after construction had been underway for
several years, that the dam was welcome, but efforts at changing Zuni religious practices
were strictly forbidden. Religion was the one realm o f the Zuni world that was off limits.

' ihid
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As Governor Chaves asked, “How can a man be a man and have two religions?” The
dam could be seen as a way to subvert religious life. If it were there to obviate the need
for the bewildering canon o f religious practices that the Zuni engaged in, then it was
designed to undermine Zuni religion. And in that case, the Zuni would not tolerate it. As
long as they could work on the dam at a pace that was guided by their ceremonial and
agricultural life, then all was well. But as soon as labor demands got in the way o f
religious obligation there was a problem, a clash of values. John Harper did not like it,
but nonetheless understood that for their “innumerable dances and ceremonies...they will
stop anything.”^
The 1880s and 90s were not years o f great activity on the Zuni reservation
regarding waterworks. The Indian Service was busy with the Navajos. But after the turn
of the century, the Indian Service shifted focus away from the Navajos and redirected
their energy into the Blackrock Dam. In the first decade and a half of the twentieth
century, the Indian Service made up for the lack o f attention they gave the Zuni in the
late nineteenth century. The work at Zuni, in fact, eventually took precedence over all
other work and the Navajo irrigation efforts would fall into disrepair. Very quickly in the
early years of this century irrigation became one of the main features of Indian Service
policy on the Colorado Plateau. It is to that complicated time that we now move.

’ A C Tonner, CIA to the Secretary o f the Interior, 13 December 1898, #50177, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75,
NA; Walter H. Graves to the Secretary o f the Interior, 24 November 1899, #57989, B ox 212, SC 190, RG
75, NA; Matilda Coxe Stevenson to William Henry Holmes, 25 February 1907, M CS file. B ox 6, NAA;
John B Harper to CIA, 8 August 1906, #69742. B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA. I borrowed the notion o f
autonomy in disorder from Mart Stewart’s insightful essay on, among other things, how slaves ordered their
world under the attempted control o f their masters on Georgia rice plantations. Mart Stewart, “Rice, Water,
and Power: Landscapes o f Domination and Resistance in the Lowcourriry, 1790-1880," Enviwnmentai
H isioiy Review 15(1991): 47-64, 57.
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**This Thing of Having Your Work Depend on the Whims of Ignorant Savages Is Not
As Pleasant As It Might Be”: Reclamation on the Zuni and Navajo Reservations,
1900-1914

The gulf that separates reclamation efforts in the twentieth century from those in
the nineteenth is vast. If an engineer working in 1905 were somehow able to travel in
time back even as recently as the 1890s and hire on to one of the several Navajo
reclamation projects he would be entering a different world. Waterworks projects were
at such an inchoate state in the late nineteenth century that the experts o f the twentieth
would probably scratch their heads and wonder what it was the amateurs of the
nineteenth were up to. When W.H. Code claimed that the efforts at Fort Defiance were
among the biggest failures o f the Indian Service, he did not direct his vitriol against the
agents on the ground. Rather, his venom was reserved for the bureaucracy of the Indian
Service. Because so little planning had gone into the projects, limited Indian Service
funds had been wasted and reclamation gained for itself a bad name. By 1905, things had
changed. Professionals, like Code himself, now worked for the Indian Service and its
newly minted Irrigation Division. The amateurish world of the nineteenth century faded
into the past and the professionalism o f the twentieth took its place.
As the Indian Service embraced the gospel of irrigation—a new thing for the
entire federal government—it had to construct the bureaucratic apparatus to
accommodate large-scale waterworks projects. No longer would individual Agents be
able to handle the demands of reclamation.

The Indian Service hired its first two

professional engineers, aside from the failed attempt in the 1890s on the Navajo
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reservation, in 1900; by 1905, a small cadre of engineers worked for the Indian Service.
W.H. Code was the peripatetic first Chief Engineer and oversaw all o f the work o f the
Irrigation Division from his headquarters in Los Angeles and on field inspections
covering thousands of miles o f the American West. Additionally, the Irrigation Division
broke the West into five irrigation districts and the Navajo and Zuni reservation fell into
District 5, which included New Mexico, southern Colorado, Utah, and northern Arizona. *
As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, and the Indian Service made
the shift to professional reclamation efforts, a new era began. Gone were the simple
attempts o f the previous twenty years when agents operated under conditions o f relative
drought, constructing minor projects. By the turn of the century, plans were made for
major waterworks on Indian Reservations in the Southwest and elsewhere. As the water
engineers and Indian agents entered the new century, they did so having learned few
lessons fi'om the past. They attempted projects that were larger and more expensive than
had ever been contemplated. As a result o f having captured little or no information about
regional climate variation, they failed to consider possible environmental changes.
Drought was all they could imagine. Too, Indian labor was relied upon for constructing
these massive waterworks. While the Irrigation Division hoped for a cheap and docile
labor force, what tliey got were discrete cultural groups operating on somewhat related,
but distinctly different, ceremonial and agricultural and hunting schedules. Where before
the Indian Service discounted Indian knowledge on how to water the desert, they now
expected their labor. But the ritual cycle of the Zuni was not going to be subverted in
order to build a dam, nor was the Navajo grazing, hunting, and planting regime. The

' For a sketch o f the basic structure o f the Irrigation Division see, McDonald, The Dispossession o f the
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change in climate at the local level and die cultural vitality of the Navajo and Zuni
peoples conspired to dash many of the dreams of the Irrigation Division."
The history o f reclaiming the Navajo and Zuni reservations gets more
complicated as the Indian Service’s plans become grander and grander and their
bureauacracy simultaneously grew.

Appropriations for irrigation in the nineteenth

century were a relatively simple matter; an agent either got the money or he did not. If
$1,200 was allocated for reclamation on the Navajo reservation, it was not taking away
from money that could have been spent at Zuni. Before there was an irrigation budget,
money eidier came out of general reservation allocations or were special outlays based on
the merits o f each case. More importantly, the amounts doled out were small. Not so in
the twentieth century; yearly budgets in the hundreds o f thousands of dollars became
common.

And by 1911, the Indian Service was spending more than $1 million on

waterworks. As the first decade o f the new centuiy wore on, the Irrigation Division
began to become more concerned with the investments they had made than they were
with reclaiming land for Indians. The amount of money that was spent on the Zuni dam,
for example, led the Irrigation Division to try to protect that project rather iliau more
evenly distributing funds to all projects on the Colorado Plateau.^
With a general and very finite budget the Irrigation Division had to decide on the
relative merits of particular projects. Now, money spent one place was money not spent
another. Projects in District 5, all operating from the bumc budget, essentially competed
American Indian, 75-76.
^ Pisani, Nationalizing the Waters, chapters 7 and 8; for importance o f religion in the Pueblos, see Dozier,
The Pueblo Indians o f North America, 90, 104-105
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for funds. Engineers working on local projects submitted their budgets to the Chief
Engineer, who then submitted them to the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs and on down
the line to the Congress. Larger projects, of course, got more money, but as we will see,
often to the exclusion and neglect o f smaller ones. On the Colorado Plateau, the Navajo
and the Zuni projects were at the mercy of this system. The Indian Service spent in favor
of the Blackrock dam, in terms of money, energy, and expertise, and this led to the
neglect of the Navajo. As the Irrigation Division worked to build the Blackrock dam and
control the flooding that was destroying it, they ignored circumstances on the Navajo
reservation. As discussed in the Navajo chapter, the Indian Service was vexed constantly
by the question of whether the Navajo were fit for farming or were purely pastoralists.
The developments in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century settled the
debate. As spending went way over budget on the Zuni dam, and welter years visited the
Colorado Plateau, the Irrigation Division determined that the Navajo were indeed
stockraisers and money spent on irrigation projects was money wasted.
The projects on the Navajo and Zuni reservations became so intertwined that their
history, in some respects, is a common one. To be sure, circumstances were peculiar to
each project, but they were both affected by the change in the weather and the shift from
amateurism to professionalism in the Indian Service. Shortly after construction began the
Blackrock Dam started to soak up such a large portion of the resources of the Irrigation
Division of the Indian Service that each year little was left for other projects. In 1908,
W.H. Code asked for an extra $25,000 to be added to the appropriation for Indian

^ H ouse D oc. #203, 62*** Cong., 2"^ Sess., 1911, Serial 6324, p 2; for the cumulative costs o f waterworks
projects for the period in question see. Irrigation Projects on Indian R esenations Etc., H ouse D oc. #1286,
63"“ Cong., 3"* Sess,, 1914, Serial 6891; McDonald, 76-78.
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irrigation, to be used exclusively for the Blackrock Dam. He feared that if the extra
money was not granted other irrigation projects in the area would suffer.

That is,

$25,000 would be spent on the Blakcrock dam regardless of whether or not Code got
extra funds; he simply hoped that additional money would be found so that he could
direct some of it towards the Pueblo and Navajo reservations. The Blackrock Dam had
cost the government so much to date that Code thouglit it best to keep going and “not be
stopped until sufficient lands are fully covered with a distributing system to afford the
Zuni Indians a full opportunity along agricultural lines.” As more and more flooding
wreaked havoc in the region, more and more money was pumped into the Zuni project.
Eventually money was spent just to keep the project going and to justify previous
expense. By 1910 $371,477.30 had been spent on the dam and it needed further repairs.
The Commissioner o f Indian Affairs found himself “loathe to recommend further
appropriations,” but was willing to do so “in order to protect the large sum of money
already invested in the dam.” By siphoning off so many o f the resources of the Irrigation
Division, the

development at Zuni

underdevelopment at Navajo.

contributed to, but did

not cause, the

The Irrigation Division, primarily because of John

Harper’s obsession with Blackrock, neglected projects on the Navajo reservation.'*
The Navajo were the object o f great scrutiny during the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. The Indian Service devoted much time and energy to transform them
into settled agriculturists—to be sure, much of their energy was spent in ruminating on
the possibilities that agriculture held for the Navajo and less in actual effort. But after

“* W .H. Code to the Secretary o f the Treasury, 14 November 1908, Irrigation System on Zuni Indian
Reservation, 60th. Cong., 2"** sess., 1908, H. Doc. 1102, Serial 5556; Irrigation Systems on Indian
Resen>ations, 5 December 1910, 61** Cong , 2""* sess., 1910, S. Doc. 689, Serial 5943.
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the Blackrock Dam, along with the Hogback ditch on the Navajo reservation, began to
soak up all resources the Irrigation Division began to question whether or not the Navajo
were suited to farming after all. Eventually, the Irrigation Division abandoned efforts at
reclaiming the Navajo reservation for agriculture.^ The government decided to stock
their range further with sheep and fully develop a pastoral economy. After more than a
quarter century spent trying to turn the Navajo into farmers, the Irrigation Division
decided that they were not agriculturists. It appeared easy for the Irrigation Division,
once plans started to go awry, to reclassify the Navajo. Perceptions o f them had, thus,
turned 360 degrees. They went from being nomads to farmers and back again. The
Navajo became, again, "wild" Indians.
As the Irrigation Division was making this decision, more and more instances of
Navajo encroachmerit on Hopi land crept into the record. The “peaceful” Hopi need
protection from the “wild” Navajo.

Impressions made of the Navajo during the late

nineteenth century eventually won out over efforts to turn them into farmers. And the
events of the first decade and a half of the twentieth century—the climate change and the
resultant failure o f the Blackrock Dam—which led to the Navajo being reclassified as
sheepherders resulted in the eventual overstocking o f their range.

When the Indian

Service began to realize that the Navajo country could not be reclaimed on a large scale
they took the recent wet conditions as an indicator of, again, normal climate. The wet
years provided good forage for stock. In the first fifteen years of the twentieth century
the Navajo range was stocked with more livestock than it had ever been before.

^ The Indian Service did attempt one other large project before World War I, at Ganado Charles S.
Peterson, “Headgates and Conquest; The Limits o f Irrigation on the Navajo Reservation, 1880-1950,” New
M exico Historical Review 68 (1993): 269-290.
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Increased pressure from off the reservation by non-Indian ranchers contributed to the
decline in range quality. By the time the Navajo had, again, become purely pastoralists,
conditions had changed.^
I am not suggesting that the Zuni necessarily benefited from the construction of
the Blackrock Dam. Rather, the dam became the primary project in the region and all
other waterworks projects were subordinated to it. The dam became the object of
improvement and development, not the Zuni people. The lack of useful information
collected in the nineteenth century led the Indian Service to attempt projects that they
were unprepared for. The Indian Service never tapped their greatest resource for advice
on how to live in the desert: the Navajo and Zuni people. This chapter, then, will be a
joint history o f the projects on the Navajo and Zuni reservations.
As discussed in the Zuni chapter, interest in irrigation rapidly picked up pace in
the late 1890s. To the Indian Service, a dam was now an imperative. And by 1901
surveys o f irrigation possibilities were well underway. Heading the effort was John B.
Harper, the Superintendent of Irrigation on the Jicarilla and Pueblo Indian Reservations.
Harper was in charge of irrigation efforts in the Pueblos, and eventually the Navajo
Reservation, until his death in 1908. Throughout his tenure in the Southwest Harper
never cared to understand Indians, nor did he like tiiem very much. He was constantly

®“Betw een 1893 and 1900 there w as a precipitous decline in stock numbers followed by an equally rapid
recovery between 1900 and 1915 that brought the total stock number to their highest level since the Navajos
w ere placed on the reservation.” Richmond and Baron, 219; see also Ian Cambell, “Climate and Overgrazing
on the Shonto Plateau, Arizona,” Professional Geographer 22(1970): 137. Cambell posits that the
overgrazing problem on the Navajo reservation w as, indeed, a problem, but that climate as a factor, rather than simply inelKcient Navajo shepherds, is to o often overlooked; on the increasing pressure from o ff the
reservation and additional information on the stocking o f the range see. White, 229-231 ; see also Lawrence
C Kelly, The Navajo Indians atidFederal Policy, 7 9 0 0 - /9 i5 (Tucson: Univ. o f Arizona Press, 1968): 104114.
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vexed by their ceremonial life and he had little patience for “Indians who cannot tell one
end o f a steel pipe from another.” But Harper possessed boundless amounts o f energy
and maintained unflagging dedication to the work at hand During 1901 Harper surveyed
the Zuni Reservation, got to know the other Pueblos, and built a small ditch at San
Ildefonso. He was keyed up about the prospects of irrigation development, and found the
Indians grateful for the good work that he did^
Harper is one o f the central characters in this story. No other individual had as
much control over the projects as he, and no one was more obsessed with getting the
Blackrock dam up and running. Harper’s impressions o f the Zuni are some o f the most
valuable that we have. He possessed none of the arrogance, or interest for that matter, of
anthropologists and thus his characterizations of the Zuni, and the other Indians he
employed, are the candid remarks o f a man who worked with and lived with the Zuni for
nearly eight years. He was not consciously observing them, but he needed to know the
habits of the Zuni in order that he could be an effective supervisor. After all, he was their
boss, of sorts. Although o f a different sort. Harper’s tenure among the Indians of the
Southwest, and Zuni in particular, was just as valuable for insights into Indian history as
those of some of his more famous anthropological contemporaries, among them Matilda
Coxe Stevenson. Harper was not concerned with discerning the inner life of the Zuni or
getting at the meanings behind their ceremonies. On the contrary, it seems as if he could
have cared less, except for when Zuni religious life got in the way of work on the dam.
And Zuni religious life frequently got in the way. Harper was a dedicated correspondent;

’ John B. Harper to CIA, 25 January 1901; 12 April 1901; 17 June 1901; 1 July 1901, B ox 212, SC 190, RG
75. N A , SC 190.
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his letters number in the hundreds.

They are the basis of the history of irrigation

development that follows; no other better chronicler exists.
After spending six months among the Pueblos, Harper concluded that the Zuni
were most in need o f a dam; according to him, they had the largest population and were
the poorest. Harper provides the first intimations of the precedence o f the Zuni dam over
other projects when he suggested that work in the other Pueblos be put on hold until the
Zuni work could be finished. But until the Indian Service made firm plans for Zuni he
had work to do in the other Pueblos and spent much of 1902 at Cochiti, Sandia, and Zia
Pueblos. By the beginning of 1903 Harper had drafted formal plans for the Zuni dam.
W.H. Code sent a report to the Secretary o f the Interior in April, approving Harper’s
suggestions, and in July $40,000 was allocated for the dam. Code confessed ignorance in
several matters concerning the Zuni dam. He was most concerned with the fact that a
gauging station had not been built at Zuni when the dam pwoject was first contemplated.
Now only guesses could be made concerning the flow o f the river and run-off from the
mountains. Code was concerned that adequate data did not exist to determine whether or
not they could fill a reservoir or even how big to make one. Nevertheless, both he and
Harper calculated, based on the size of the watershed and the average of fifteen inches of
rain per year, that the reservoir would fill six times during the year. But this would
depend, Code admitted, on the “character o f the rain storms.” Code counted on the rains
that fell in July and August to be the principal source of surplus water for the reservoir.
He did not consider the possibility of rains coming at different times o f the year, greater
than average snowpack, or the summer rains increasing in intensity.
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Plans were

SI

underway for the largest 'project yet contemplated on the Colorado Plateau with
guesswork as the data.®
Harper spent the next year solidifying plans for the dam; by the summer o f 1904
woik had begun. And by August Haipci ran into what would be, along witli the weatiiei,
one o f the most intractable obstacles; problems witli. Indian labor.

Tire “greatest

difficulty [with constructing the dam is the] R eliab ility o f Indian labor.”

Harper

concluded that the Z unfs best attempt was but a poor imitation of real work. According
to Matilda Coxe Stevenson, surmner solstice ceremonies began in tlie third week of June
that summer—presumably they did each year—and the rain priests were occupied, as
was much of the rest of the village, for the rest of the season. Despite the government’s
promises to deliver water on a permanent basis, the dam was not built yet and the Zuni
were still going to pray for rain. Reporting to Code that first fall, Harpei was stymied
first by the Zuni who went to harvest; then by the Navajo who had been away all fall,
variously “eating green com, then to harvest and now they are on a deer hunt.” Harper
lamented that scarcely any work was accomplished owing to the dearth of Indians. In
November, when tlie atmual Shalako dancing season began at Zuni, Harper found that
work ground to a standstill until the following spring.

By 1905 he liad learned the

rhythm of the Zuni year, “In the spring they go out on their farms and stay until about the
first of July, planting, shearing sheep & c , they then come in and want to work until
September fiisl when the liatvesling and dancing begins again.” Each fall, as it became
time to harvest or hunt, Harper counted on losing most of his workers; when Shalako

* John B. Harper to CIA, 12 July 1901; 14 April 1902; 12 August 1902; 10 August 1903, B ox 212, SC 190,
RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 13 April 1903, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA;
Thomas Ryan, Acting Secretary o f the Interior to CIA, 22 July 1903, Box 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA
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season started. Harper had to stop work entirely. Harper had reliable Indian labor, it
seems, during a window of about two months during the summer. What the agents on the
Navajo reservation had learned twenty years before. Harper was now learning; seasonal
obligations—hunting, harvesting, and ceremony—would persist despite his plans to the
contrary.^
Over the next several years Harper focused singularly on the Blackrock Dam,
letting the calls o f agents on other reservations go unheeded. As the work at Zuni slowed
down in 1904, massive floods washed out the ditches that Harper had built at Cochiti and
San Ildefonso.

Along the northern border of the Navajo Reservation, on the San Juan

River, flooding also washed out ditches. Samuel Shoemaker, Supervisor of Constructed
Ditches and Special Disbursing Agent on the Navajo Reservation, estimated that the
repairs to the ditches would run “high into the thousands.” And in the years to come.
Harper rarely found time to tend to any problems besides the ones that he encountered at
Zuni.^®
The flooding that washed out the ditches at Cochiti and San Ildefonso signaled
not only a new pattern of flooding in the region, but a new phase in irrigation history on
the Colorado Plateau. At the beginning o f 1905 Harper wondered if the weather would
not curtail work on the dam to the point where little would be accomplished.

And

throughout that year. Harper commented on the “unprecedented storms and floods.” He
wrote Code in May and said, “I have not tried to describe the conditions here for a long

^ Matilda C oxe Stevenson to W. H. Holmes, 30 June 1904; 30 August 1904, B ox 6, MCS file, NAA,; John
B Harper to CIA, 31 August 1904; 7 Novem ber 1904, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to Code, 24
October 1904; 29 November 1904; 30 Novem ber 1904, B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 27
July 1905, #60861, B ox 212, SC 190, R G 75, NA.
Samuel Shoemaker to CIA, 29 October 1904, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA,
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time, not that language was lacking, but because it would sound incredible to anyone not
experiencing it and particularly so to one familiar with the Southwest.” Harper worried
on and off about the prospect o f a “record breaking flood.”

But by April he was

confident that the Zuni watershed would not be affected by the storms and floods that
wreaked havoc in the rest o f northern New Mexico. He was shocked, then, in May when
a flood raged through the Zuni River and did several thousand dollars worth o f damage to
the dam. But after the rains passed and the country was again dry, Harper felt sure that
such weather was “not likely to be again encountered and I do not see that anything of
future value can be gained by extending the discussion of it.” Despite Harper’s cavalier
attitude, by the end o f the year he noted that winter storms started earlier and even though
“it was hard to conceive that floods like those of last spring could be expected again this
[coming] year” he predicted that they would. ^^
Harper’s reluctance to see the possibility o f another destructive season of
flooding does seem odd’ But, remember, to him the high rains of the year were an
anomaly. His keen observations did not pick up on Zuni concern for the weather; he only
mentioned that they disliked working in wet and cold conditions. Had weather like this
visited the Colorado Plateau before, thus, this time, leaving the Zuni rather blasé? They
probably knew that heavy rain in the late fall and winter would make for an auspicious
spring: good crops and good wool from their sheep. One has to wonder, did the Zuni,
like Harper, take the weather to be an anomaly or was it something they recognized? It is
difficult to do anything but speculate

*' John B. Harper to W H. Code, 24 February 1905; 10 April 1905, GC, ID, B ox 118, RG 75, NA; John B
Harper to CIA, 3 May 1905, #36382, B o x 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to Code, 5 August 1905, GC,
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Harper was clearly concerned for the future o f the dam. If the coming winter was
a repeat o f the previous one, then real trouble could be expected. Because o f Shalako
and the coming winter storms Harper proposed calling work off until May. This was an
extreme response to extreme conditions. Harper could not face another winter o f storms
and flooding. He warned Code that the weather must be considered now in planning the
dam. The inference, o f course, is that the weather was not factored in until this point.
Heavy rain was expected in the summer, but not in the winter months; He admitted as
much; there was no precedent for this type o f storming in the late fall and winter.
“Without the gift o f prophecy” Harper said he could not know what the weather would
do, but another winter like the one of 1905 would ruin the work. C ^ricious weather and
Zuni religious life— contingencies not considered until they began to get in the way—
were unraveling the Irrigation Division’s plans. Code, masking the seriousness of the
problems encountered in the 1905, wrote the Secretary o f the Interior that everything was
under control, but admitted that “unforeseen contingencies” pushed the cost way above
original estimates. It seems Code had to try to save face in front of the Secretary, but in
the correspondence between him and Harper, fear for the future o f the dam was evident.
In October, 1905 Harper raised the estimate for the dam to $100,000.

And

ironically, his misfortune led to Zuni prosperity. The rain o f the past year had provided
for good crops. The Zuni had no incentive to work on the dam. The same was true for
the Navajo laborers whom he relied on: wool prices were high and thus there was little
need to work. What was bad for Harper was good for the Indians. Not only the weather

ID, B ox 118 RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 27 July 1905, #60861, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to
Code, 1 December 1905; 31 December 1905, B o x 118, GC, ED, RG 75, NA.
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itself stonewalled the work, but now the resultant good crops and Indian prosperity might
stand in the way, too. Harper could not win.
During 1904 and 1905, along with the project at Zuni, the Irrigation Division
again surveyed the Navajo Reservation,

The story gets complicated at this stage.

Between 1905 and 1914, the Navajo and Zuni Reservations would, in effect, compete for
the finite resources o f the Irrigation Division. The Irrigation Division attempted major
projects on both reservations, the Hogback ditch on the San Juan and the Blackrock Dam
on Zuni River. Floods plagued both projects, and costs escalated year after year.*'* As a
result o f the limited resources available to the Irrigation Division, the engineers m # e
decisions concerning the fate o f the projects, and, hence, the fate of the Indians. John B.
Harper’s singular focus fostered a cycle o f neglect. After Harper’s death the Irrigation
Division tried to play catch-up on the Navajo Reservation.
In 1904, as the work on the Blackrock Dam got underway, the Irrigation Division
surveyed irrigation possibilities on the Navajo reservation. And W.H. Code hoped that
the same mistakes that the Indian Service made in the past would not be repeated. This
time, with a thorough survey o f the reservation by professional engineers—not army
officers or amateurs—the reservation might get reclaimed. And the San Juan river region
in particular came under Indian Service scrutiny as a potentially productive agricultural
area. John Wesley Powell’s vision of building a large irrigation project on the river

" John B Harper to W.H. Code, 1 Decem ber 1905, B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to the
Secretary o f the Interior, 12 Decem ber 1905, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
" John B Harper to W.H. Code, 10 October 1905, B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA,; Harper to Code, no
date. B ox 118, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
For detailed cost figures see H.F. Robinson, “Project Histories o f the Pueblos o f N ew M exico,” 1913,
Special Reports and Related Records, Series 657, Irrigation Division, B ox 97, RG 75, NA; Annual District
and Project Reports, 1909-1913, Series 655, Irrigation Division, District #5, B ox 41, RG 75, NA.
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Started to take shape. The will to spend the money was now there. The San Juan River
had traditionally provided good farming land for the Navajo, and George Butler, the
General Superintendent o f Irrigation, said that the San Juan was the best prospect for
reclamation on the entire reservation. But recently, the ditches along the river had been
neglected.

Owing to a drought in the region, the Navajo left this portion of the

reservation in search o f work. And, as a result, the amount of farming done along the
San Juan diminished. Too, the agent recognized that the drought was taking its toll on
the Navajo’s herds. “On account o f the lack o f sufficient rain or moisture in the hills and
on the mesas the feed for sheep and goats...is becoming less and less abundant each year
and makes this source o f their revenue very uncertain.” A solution was necessary.
W.T. Shelton, the agent at San Juan, fixed his sights upon what he saw as the
untapped potential of the San Juan River. The Navajos living along the river had always
taken advantage of its waters, but Shelton saw that the river had far greater potential. If
the water now flowing through the San Juan could be handled properly, Shelton claimed
that he could double the number o f Navajo families now farming along its banks and end
their nomadic ways. “It is my intention to encourage and assist the more intelligent of
the mountain Indians, now depending entirely upon their herds, to take up and improve
the farms along the ditches,” Once again, plans were being made to tame the “Free
Riders of the Plains,” to settle them in permanent homes. Shelton’s faith in the Navajo
led him to slough off offers of assistance from the Indian Service; only in the event of a

Samuel Shoemaker to CIA, 30 May 1904, #6043, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; George Butler, Supt o f ^
Irrigation to C IA 24 June 1904, #55848, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to C IA 26 July 1904,
#8039, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, N A W.T. Shelton, Supt. San Juan Training School to C IA 20 August
1904, #58517, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; G eorge Butler to C IA 24 June 1906, SC 190, B ox 210, RG
75, NA.
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flood could the Navajo not handle the work. Shelton had been at the San Juan School
only one year and was not used to the cycle o f the river. The heavy rains that fell all
across the Southwest in the fall o f 1904 sent a freshet down the San Juan in October and
ruined the ditches that he had worked so hard on. Consequently, at the beginning o f the
new year, the irrigation projects proposed by the surveys of the previous summer were
now approved. The San Juan had demonstrated its power, not only for irrigation but for
destruction. Unfortunately, the coffers were tapped and the plans would have to be put
on a hold for the year.
A couple of brief, but salient, examples from the Rio Grande Pueblos will help to
illustrate Harper’s obsession with the Blackrock dam and the neglect of other projects.
As work progressed through 1906 on the Blackrock Dam, signals appeared at the Pueblos
that Harper was not giving them their due—after all, he was in charge of projects in the
whole region and this included the Pueblos. The floods that overflowed the Rio Grande
and its tributaries in 1904 and 1905 left in their wake destroyed ditches at many of the
Pueblos. C.J. Crandall, Superintendent o f the Pueblo Agency, hoped that Harper would
be able to visit Cochiti, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso Pueblos in the coming months to
assess the damage and make recommendations for repairs. The situation was dire, for
“many o f the Pueblos raised but little last year.”

Irrigation ditches were essential:

without them the Pueblos had no way o f watering their fields. But Crandall found that
Harper, over the last two years, had spent the bulk of his time at work at Zuni. He had

Shelton to CIA, 20 August 1904, #58517, B o x 210, SC 190, RG 75, NA; CIA to Secretary o f the
Interior, 24 January 1905, B ox 210, SC 190, RG 75, N A .
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not inspected the other Pueblos since before the heavy rains of 1904, and thus was unable
to see the gravity o f the situation.
Harper visited in April, but told Crandall that he could not get to the work until
the end of the summer; there was too much to do on the Blackrock Dam. Of course,
summer was the crucial planting and rainy season. If Harper neglected the Pueblos for
another summer, the consequences would likely be harmful.

Crandall was getting

worried and wrote the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs that if the ditch was not rebuilt
soon the “Pueblo Indians of San Ildefonso will be in a short time in the same condition
that they were five years ago[when the ditch was first built]—destitute. Early in May, as
Harper got work under way at Zuni, a massive flood came down the Rio Grande and
finished off what was left of the San Ildefonso ditch. The flood washed away any hope of
getting a crop in for the year. Oddly enough, as Crandall worried over the Indians at San
Ildefonso, Harper was complaining again about Zuni and Navajo prosperity. The rain of
the last two years, combined with the high price o f wool, provided both with such good
crops and abundant cash that they were too independent, again, to work on the dam. At
San Ildefonso, where for centuries they had been able to farm on their own, the situation
was dire. Now that the Indian Service had made promises to fix the ditches that they had
built, the Indians came to rely on their assistance. But when help did not come, disaster
ensued Dependence on Indian Service technical know-how seems to have lulled the San
Ildefonsons into helplessness.

The broken promises of the Indian Service regarding

irrigation were largely due to Harper's neglect.**

C j Crandall to CIA, 19 February 1906, #17912, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
it is interesting to note that Crandall felt com pelled to write the Commissioner; it indicates that he could
not rely on Harper to concern him self with the other Pueblos. C.J. Crandall to CIA, 13 April 1906, #34064,
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At San Ildefonso the recent rains filled the Rio Pojoaque and irrigation from it
was possible. But in the event o f a dry season, the ditch on the Rio Grande would have to
fixed.

Harper warned that the Pojoaque did not run in dry years, and “when the

inevitable dry cycle returns they must have water from the Rio Grande, or do without.”
O f course, Crandall feared that Harper would not help and San Ildefonso would have no
water. He worried that if immediate action were not taken San Ildefonso would shortly
find itself without crops. However, Crandall realized the Government had spent a lot of
money thus far on the ditch, some $7,000, and that anything they built now might not last
long. Additionally, he noted that even if they lost their crops, many of them worked
anyway in beet fields and lumber camps, and “ten o f them having been attached to a wild
west show at Cony [sic] Island last sununer...brought home round about $1000.” Thus,
the loss of their subsistence from agriculture was mollified by their entrance into the
wage system.*’
One should not be tempted to blame this situation entirely on Harper’s neglect.
Indeed, many Indians in the Southwest were involved in the wage economy. But I do
want to suggest that there is a link between Harper’s preoccupation with the Blackrock
Dam and the lack of development at San Ildefonso. In fact, San Ildefonso Pueblo would
go without water development entirely.

In 1908, H.F. Robinson, Superintendent of

Irrigation and Harper’s replacement, recommended that no waterworks be built at San
Ildefonso owing to the cost and the small population. By 1910, Robinson found that.

B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; John B. Harper to W.H. Code, 4 May 1906, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA;
Harper to CIA, 7 May 1906, #41728, B o x 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA; Harper to W.H. Code, 16 July 1906,
GC, ID, B ox I1 9 .R G 7 5 . N A
*’ C.J. Crandall to CIA, 31 December 1906, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA,
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The result [of my decision] has been that the San Ildefonso Indians have been
without water for about five years excepting the flood water they secure from the
Pojoaque River. They now are unable to raise much in the way of crops, and this year
being very dry, what they did plant is rapidly drying up, although the rains which are Just
beginning may save them. The entire male population of the Pueblo is away earning
money to keep their families from starvation.

Robinson suggested spending $4,000 on a temporary ditch from the Rio Grande,
otherwise, “the San Ildefonso Indians have practically no other hope of sustenance other
than leaving their town and going to woiic.” With the hindsight of only a few years,
Robinson saw the link between choosing to spend money in one place and not another.
The work on the Zuni Dam was contributing to the underdevelopment of the other
Pueblos.
The same was true on the Western Navajo reservation. Located on the periphery
of official Navajo land, with its headquarters at Tuba City, this section of the reservation
was routinely neglected by Harper. In fact, the Commissioner o f the Indian Affairs was
forced to intervene and urge the Irrigation Division to attend to matters in this remote
section. Harper had had little time for the Navajo reservation. And by 1908, Stephan
Janus, the Superintendent was fed up. He had repeatedly asked that reclamation work be
done. By the summer o f 1908, he bypassed the Irrigation Division and wrote directly to
the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs and complained that a lot of money had been spent
investigating the water supply but that no work had ever been done. The situation was
dire.

Lack of water was forcing the Navajos who lived out in this section of the

reservation to encroach on Hopi land, and this would continue until reclamation work
was done. But Janus’s calls went largely unheeded. The Irrigation Division did not have

“ H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 5 August 1910, GC, ID, B ox 112, RG 75, N A
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time to tend to the type o f small projects— a dam across Moenkopi wash—that Janus
wanted them to; the dam at Zuni was taking all of their time and resources. All he could
manage was a small dam that washed out time and again.^’
If 1906 was a good year for the Zuni and the Navajo crops and wool, it was a bad
one for John B. Harper and the Blackrock Dam. In December, Harper wrote, “We have
had an abominable season since the first o f April—either sand storms or floods most of
the time.” Harper reported that the whole of the Southwest had been hard hit by storms
over the past two years; he blamed regional flooding for the destruction of roads and
railroad bridges and the formation of the Salton Sea, in California.

Due to recent

prosperity, the Zuni and Navajo were too independent and would not work on anything
resembling a reliable schedule.

Harper lamented that “the indirect results of the

abnormal seasons have been fully as serious to us as the direct ones.” He found, again,
that the pace of work on the dam proceeded as the weather and the Indians—^Navajo and
Zuni both—allowed. When the dancing began at Zuni “what you will do is not what is
necessary or what you want to do, but what you can. This thing of having your work
depend on the whims of ignorant savages is not as pleasant as it might be.” Pleasant or
not, the annual cycle that had been in place for ages prevailed over the imposed order

CIA to H.F. Robinson, 30 March 1908, GC, ID, B ox 109, RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to CIA, 9 July
1908, GC, ID, B ox 118; RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to W.H. Code, 4 August 1908, GC, ID, B ox 118, RG
75, NA; Stephen Janus to CIA, 30 September 1908; 4 Novem ber 1908, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; CIA to W H.
Code, 24 November 1908, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Stephen Janus to W .H Code, 12 January 1909, GC, ID,
RG 75, NA; C.R. Olberg, Acting C hief Engineer, to Stephen Janus, 18 January 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA;
Stephen Janus to C.R. Olberg, 23 January 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to Stephen Janus, 4
February 1909, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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that Harper and the Irrigation Division tried to foist on both the environment and the
Indians."'
When work commenced in April, 1907, Harper had to contend with a small labor
force. By the middle o f the summer work was up and running, but in August destructive
flooding shut the project down for two weeks. And by September, the Zuni were in their
fields harvesting com. Harper reported that the com was ripe early that year and thus the
Zuni had no incentive to work. Additionally, he had come to realize that, indeed, each
autumn, the Zuni left for their fields. The rest of the fall was a slow one. As was the
custom each year, the Zuni abandoned work on the dam late in the season. In early
December, Harper noted that “there are only twenty men at work today and tomorrow the
Chalico [sic] dance begins and there will be a succession of dances firom this time until
spring.

For a few days we will have no men, and after that the prospect is very

discouraging.” At the same time, workers from other Pueblos left to attend to their
ceremonial schedules. And to top it all off. Harper, again, noted that the Indians in the
region were too prosperous that year to want much work The recent rains were washing
out ditches and dams and rendering the Navajo and Zuni too prosperous to want work.
This two pronged assault on irrigation efforts insured slow progress.^^
At the San Juan Agency, the government built ditches were in a shambles. The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs hoped that Harper would be able to get to the Navajo
Reservation, but the work at Blackrock kept him busy. By this time the agents working

“ John B. Harper to W.H. Code, 16 July 1906; John B Harper to W H. Code, 26 December 1906, GC, CD,
B o x 119, RG 75, NA; Harper to CIA, 24 January 1907, #11218, B ox 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
John B. Harper to W.H. Code, 7 September 1907; 4 October 1907; 4 December 1907, GC, ID, B ox 119,
RG 75, NA; Harper to C E Albing, acting C hief Engineer, 9 December 1907, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75,
NA.
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on the Navajo Reservation were upset; the areas that they oversaw had been neglected for
too long. In 1907 the Indian Service sent a Special Agent, R.S. Connell, to inspect the
work done thus far on the Navajo reservation and to see about the complaints o f the
Agents. He reported to the Commissioner on the sad state of affairs at the San Juan
school.
Connell first noted that the San Juan school was foolishly located on the bottoms
of the San Juan river.
A western man who had seen the devilish freaks of such rivers as the Rio Puerco,
Rio Grande, and the San Juan, would never have put a school on the bottoms,
between the bluffs o f one of these rivers. At one time the channel is on one side
o f the bottom and the next time you see it in the middle, and perhaps another it
will be across on the other side. It stays in one place just long enough to give a
tender- foot time to get a nice home started where the river channel had once been
and in time will be again.

Connell clearly recognized the capricious nature o f the river, something that the
Irrigation Division’s engineers failed to do. Connell found the status of the Indian farms
along the river “deplorable.” The ditches built by the government’s “so called irrigation
experts” were an utter failure, and “spoiled the ditches that the Indians had previously
made.” Connell appeared to understand that the Navajo who farmed along the San Juan
knew that the river shifted, and that is why, year after year, they built new ditches. Any
attempt at permanency would have resulted in frustration and failure. Cormell’s report
pointed out, again, the need to utilize captured information about the environment. And
that could not be done by a stream of ever shifting agents who tried to control an ever
shifting river.

R.S. Connell to CIA, 11 April 1907, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA.

” ibid
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Connell went further and said.
The Government irrigation experts not only ruined the Indian ditches, but no
headgates were properly put in by these men and the river in freshets came
through them with such force that it cut deep gullies in them and in some places
the river changes its course and [cuts] a channel down the big government
ditches. For miles down the river are scattered dead fruit tress and orchards,
showing that these Indians were once prosperous and thrifty farmers. The Indians
are very much discouraged from this and feel that the Government has not treated
them fairly. They say that all o f their farms are ruined except two.^^

Years of bungling efforts on the San Juan left the Navajo without profitable
farms; attempts to force them to settle permanently in places along the river were ill
conceived and ill fated, and small scale diversion ditches were no match for the San
Juan.
While Connell may have recognized that the Navajo were better suited than the
Irrigation Division to planning waterworks on the San Juan in the past, his sights were set
on the future. Had Connell arrived on the Navajo reservation in the 1880s he would have
been well suited to the task; he knew that the Navajo understood the foolishness of
attempting permanent structures. But he was o f a different generation. Now was the
time to attempt a permanent project. The Navajo had done an adequate job in the past,
but they could not be expected to construct anything o f permanence. Connell was, to be
sure, sympathetic to the Navajo, but, like the rest of his generation, he believed in
progress. It was time to abandon the old ways for modem ones. If the “theoretical
experts...whose long suit is on paper’ could be shoved aside and a man “who builds
irrigation works on the ground” be found, then a permanent way o f tapping the riches of
the San Juan would soon be at hand. Connell identified the area where the San Juan runs
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between high cliffs, the Hogback, as the ideal place to divert water through a tunnel and
thus irrigate twenty thousand acres of fertile land. The river would not be able to change
course as it ran between these cliffs, thus the problem would be solved. As the Irrigation
Division made plans to channel water through the Hogback and thus control the San
Juan, they also planned to control the Navajo. Water would follow a rigid trajectory and
so would the Navajo. Connell wondered why the irrigation experts had not seen this spot
before him; he answered his own question; “Because if they would use nature, their work
would not show up so well on paper.
In March, 1908 John B. Harper took ill and suddenly died. The dam proper at
Zuni was finished early in the year. Only the ditches to supply water to Zuni fields
needed to be completed. Harper had lived to see the dam become a reality, but not to see
it in action. Before he died, however, he recommended holding off on the San Juan
project. Ostensibly, he felt that the ditch could wait, but W.H. Code admitted to the
Secretary of the Interior that, in fact. Harper had miscalculated and the Blackrock Dam
had again gone over budget. Money needed to be diverted from the San Juan project and
directed toward the Blackrock Dam. Code h c ^ d that other projects on the Navajo and
Hopi reservations, besides the one on the San Juan, would not suffer. Code allowed that
Harper, in his zeal to see the Zuni dam completed, had neglected other projects. He
acknowledged the cries from the Navajo and Hopi agents, and “hope[d] that there will be
no further cause for complaint from that section.”'*

ibid
28

W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 17 March 1908, GC, ED, B ox 119, RG 75, NA.
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Throughout 1908, the work at Zuni and on the Hogback ditch remained relatively
idle. No money, for the moment, was available to complete the Zuni dam, or to begin the
Hogback project.

In October, H.F. Robinson, Harper’s successor, estimated that the

Blackrock Dam was going to cost an extra $40,000. At the same moment that Robinson
reported to Code that the project at Zuni was far froni complete, a flood raged down the
San Juan and washed out the ditch that Connell had so roundly criticized. And at the end
o f the year the Secretary o f the Interior wrote the Secretary of the Treasury and
recommended that the extra money be spent on the Zuni Dam; otherwise what had been
spent thus far would be wasted. Thus, the Hogback project was put on hold for a little
while longer, the Navajo farms along the San Juan stood in disrepair and not a single acre
was irrigated under the Zuni irrigation project. The Irrigation Division’s plans were not
going as planned.^^
Code and Robinson started to notice, soon after Harper’s death, that work on
projects other than Zuni had suffered. Both men admitted that Harper spent too much
time on the Blackrock Dam, and had not allocated sufficient funds or personnel to the
other reservations.

Robinson accused “Mr. Harper [of] putting his entire time and

attention to the Zuni dam, [and] all of the other work has been badly neglected for the
last three or four years.” What’s more, neither Code nor Robinson seemed to have
noticed this before. Code urged Robinson to push work ahead on other projects, with the
exception of the Hogback, so that the $30,000 left in the fund would not be returned to
the treasury in July, the end o f the fiscal year. Code also warned Robinson that “the
Indian Irrigation cannot go on in the old free way, where the engineers seemed to be

H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 12 October 1908, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; Secretary o f the Interior
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responsible to neither man or god.” The implication was, o f course, that they had been
answering to no one, that money was spent at the whim of the engineer. To be sure.
Harper had been answering to no one; he spent the money he was allocated as he saw fit.
Thus, problems with the institutional structure o f the Irrigation Division helped along the
neglect at sites other than Zuni. To prevent circumstances like this the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs instituted a system o f quarterly financial reports designed to keep better
tabs on the notoriously profligate Irrigation Division.
Code and Robinson were now in a rush to prioritize; they had to “decide on the
relative values” of the various projects. Indeed, Code was loathe to proceed with largescale projects on the Navajo reservation.

He thought it wise to wait and see how

successful the Zuni dam was before taking on any other major waterworks. Code was
beginning to question the feasibility of reclaiming Indian land on the Colorado Plateau.
After finally realizing that Harper had siphoned off almost all the funds each year for the
benefit of the Zuni dam, it was apparent why little had been accomplished on the Navajo
reservation.

Because of the overspending on the Blackrock dam, little money was left

for other projects and Code confided to Robinson that the “gigantic San Juan
scheme...looks like a pipe dream,” and wondered could $10,000 to $12,000 more be

to the Secretary o f the Treasury, 24 Decem ber 1908, GC, ED, B ox 119, RG 75, NA.
W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 27 November 1908, GC, ED, B ox 109, RG 75, NA; H F
Robinson to W.H. Code, 2 April 1908; 2 0 May 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA; W H. Code to
Robinson, 7 April 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA; Code to Robinson, 10 July 1908, GC, ID. Box 103
RG 75, NA. Because o f space limitations 1 am only discussing the Hogback project, but Harper’s neglect
w as also felt at Fort Defiance and on the western edge o f the reservation at Tuba. For information on the
other projects on the reservation see Samuel S. Shoemaker, Supervisor o f Constructed Ditches and Special
Dispersing Agent to CIA, 30 May 1904, SC 190, B ox 210, RG 75, NA. This nine page report gives a basic
outline o f the progress being made on other projects on the reservation. See also, George Butler, General
Superintendent o f Irrigation to CIA, 24 June 1906, SC 190, B ox 210, RG 75, NA. Butler’s nineteen page
report is full o f detail regarding irrigation across the entire reservation.
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diverted to the Zuni Dam. After all. Code said, “these Indians [the Navajo] are good
herdsmen, and can always obtain a good living from their s h e e p . R o b i n s o n agreed.
I fully concur in your views that the [Navajo and Hopi] Indians are herdsmen and
not farmers. It is shown that they are many of them anxious to have a chance to
put a little com ect. but none o f them will put in more that they need for their own
immediate uses. Their flocks are more valuable than their crops, and to find
grazing they must of necessity be nOmadic. Stock water is of greater necessity
than irrigation water. A large amount of money has been spent for the latter, and
the net results are infentesimal [sic] as yet.^^

The consequences of Code’s and Robinson’s conclusions are difficult to gauge.
Over the next several years the little major work was done on the Navajo Reservation;
most energy was thrown into surveying underground sources of water for stock raising.
Herbert Gregory, a geologist for the U.S. Geological Survey on loan to the Irrigation
Division to help out with underground water surveys, helped Code and Robinson come to
this conclusion.

In his estimation, Navajo country was not suited to farming; the

Navajos’ land should be developed for stock raising. And his opinion held sway with the
Indian Service. Thus when he recommended “that the region be developed for stock,
especially sheep; that no large irrigation enterprises designed for agriculture be
undertaken,” the Indian Service was disposed to listen.
The Hogback ditch, however, would be constructed. Cries from W.T. Shelton
throughout 1909 finally pricked up the ears o f the Irrigation Division. Shelton’s earlier
aversion to the Irrigation Division gave way after the flooding in the fall of 1908. It was
now time for a major project on the San Juan; temporary structures failed too often.

" H.F. Robinson to W H. Code, 20 May 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA; W H Code to H.F
Robinson, 6 November 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA.
H.F. Robinson to W.H. C ode, 10 Novem ber 1908, GC, ID, B ox 103, RG 75, NA.
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Code was tired o f being criticized for the Division’s efforts on the San Juan. “The
Engineers of the Indian Service have already come in for a great deal of criticism due to
the failure of the ditches heretofore constructed [on the San Juan], and any work that we
do there now should be built so that it would stay.” Robinson hoped the money allocated
for the Pueblos could be sacrificed in favor of the Hogback project, the Commissioner of
Indian Affaire and Code agreed, and the project was approved.
O f course, there were immediate problems.

Within a couple of months after

construction began Robinson observed that the San Juan river was at its highest stage in
fifteen years and wondered would the present plans be sufficient to control the river. In
September floods raged down the San Juan and devastated the project. Plans had to be
altered month by month as contingencies no one had planned for kept popping up. By
the following summer Robinson estinjated that the project would cost $134,371.45.^^
Not coincidentally, the same week in early September that flooding visited the
San Juan, severe flooding also filled the Zuni river. The Blackrock Dam, after initially
hopeful reports to the contrary, was badly damaged. W.H. Code estimated that $125,000

Herbert E. Gregory “Water Resources o f the Navajo-M oki Reservation,” NARA, GC, ID, B ox 110.
There is no definite date on G regory’s eighty-four page report, but it w as filed with letters from 1909-1910.
W.T. Shelton to C IA 22 January 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, R G 75, NA; W.T. Shelton to H F Robinson, 22
January 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; J.T. Quinton, asst, engineer, to W.H. Code, 31 March 1909,
GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; W.H. C ode to H.F. Robinson, 7 April 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA;
H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 23 April 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to H F Robinson,
7 May 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA.
” H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 8 July 1909; 24 September 1909, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; J.M
Martin, asst, engneer to Code, 10 Novem ber 1909, GC, ID, B o x 106, RG 75, NA; Robinson to Code, 21
January 1910; 20 July 1910, GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; for the flooding on the San Juan see W.B.
Freeman and R.H. Bolster, Surface Water o f the United States, Part fX, Colorado River Basin, 1909, Water
Supply Paper 269, Washington: GPO, 1911, 187-190.
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would be needed to salvage the project.

By the end of the 1909, five years after

construction began on the dam, no land was irrigated.
But the Irrigation Division would not take responsibility for the damage done to
the dam. They blamed it on nature. The reasoning went like this: If problems o f this sort
could have been predicted maybe then the dam would not have been attempted; to
protect a dam from the sort o f flooding that was now reducing it to rubble might have
made it prohibitively expensive. What the Irrigation Division was saying was that if they
knew it would have been such a disaster they would not have tried in the first place. It is
this sort o f logic that is so instructive. If the Indian Service had really thought about and
planned the projects they attempted, something they seem assiduously to have avoided,
then they may have realized the folly of their efforts. If they had initially factored in
contingencies such as massive floods, then they might not have gone ahead with the
project. As late as 1910, adequate stream flow records for the Zuni River did not exist,
making work, at this late date in the enterprise, still smack o f guesswork.
The flooding that devastated both the Zuni dam and the Hogback ditch had a
sobering affect on W.H. Code. In the summer of 1910, with the Blackrock dam still in
disrepair, he wrote to the Secretary o f the Interior looking for more money, but, above
all, for sympathy. If he had known that the project was going to cost so much, with so
little to show, he would never have built it; but, in the meantime, more money was

“ H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 7 September 1909 (telegram), GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, N A ,; W .B. Hill,
asst, engineer to Code, 13 September 1909 (telegram), GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; Rollin Ritter, asst,
supt. o f irrigation to Code, 13 September 1909, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; W .B. Hill and W.H.
Saunders, asst, engineers to Code, 16 October 1909, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; Code to the Secretary
o f the Interior, 29 October 1909, GC, ID, B ox 119, RG 75, NA; for the flooding on the Zuni see H. F.
Robinson, Flood on the Zuni River, Arizona, September 6, 1909, Water Supply Paper 269, 206-210; on the
lack o f stream flow data see J.M. Martin, acting C hief Engineer, to W.H. Code, 28 March 1910, B ox 120,
GC, ID, RG 75, NA
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necessary in order that the funds already spent would not go to waste. Code’s primary
concern had become protecting the Indian Bureau’s $300,000 investment. Code still did
not address the lack o f planning and the ignorance of the Irrigation Division. Code could
be humble, but never did he try to ascribe blame to anything or anyone but the forces of
nature or Indian intransigence. By this time, it was clear that he was in despair. He had
signed off on all of Harper’s requests for money and more time, rarely questioning his
work. Now, he was afraid it was all for naught.
Flooding revisited the San Juan River in the fall of 1910 and 1911, further
curtailing work on the Hogback project. Robinson claimed that the flooding o f 1910 was
worse than the previous year. But the flooding o f 1911, in Robinson’s estimation, beat
both years. The damage to the ditch was so severe that engineers were pulled off projects
elsewhere In the West to assist with inspecting the destruction. Code seemed ready to
give up when he wondered “if a maximum high water mark can ever be determined
upon” for the San Juan river. Part of the problem, again, was ignorance concerning local
conditions.^*
Throughout 1912, both projects experienced further problems. The Blackrock
Dam was operating in a limited fashion by the summer o f 1911, but promptly after it
started to be put to use, siltation on a grand scale became a problem. The reservoir was
so quickly filling with silt that it was being rendered useless. Again, this appears to be a

” W H Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, ? June 1910, GC, ID, B ox 120, RG 75, NA; for further
evidence o f the need to take money away from other projects see W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the
Interior, 29 October 1909, B ox 119, GC, ED, RG 75, NA; W.H. C ode to CIA, 18 April 1911, B ox 120, GC,
ID, RG 75, NA.
H F Robinson to W.H. Code, 9 October 1909; 26 October 1909; 27 October 1909, GC. ID, B ox 106,
RG 75, NA; Extract from Report o f Edward G. Gerbsbach, Superintendent o f construction in charge o f the
work at the Hogback Canal,” 9 October 1909, GC. ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; C ode to Hill, 28 October
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contingency that Code had not considered. After realizing that the reservoir was so soon
filling with silt, he warned that this would be a problem all over the Southwest. That this
would come as a surprise to the chief engineer is odd indeed.

But from Code’s

correspondence and tone, it seems as if the sediment carried by streams in the Southwest,
or anywhere for that matter, had not previously been considered as a limiting factor in
storing water. In the 1880s or 90s, as the Indian Service began its reclamation efforts,
this kind o f oversight was expected, but not seven years into a major project. At the
Hogback ditch, flooding once again wreaked havoc, this time in the spring o f the year.
For the Hogback, 1912 was a bad year. No further construction was attempted; the whole
year was spent repairing the damage done over the previous year! Additionally, W.T.
Shelton reported trouble rounding up a labor force; the Navajo were out lambing and
planting, as they were that time every year. Eventually he employed his reservation
police force to coerce Navajos into working on the ditch, albeit with little success. These
two projects, both so costly, were bearing little fruit.
Heavy rains and flooding continued over the next few years.

In 1914, for

example, Robinson reported that the usual summer storms began to fall in May rather
1909 (telegram). B ox 106, GC, ED, RG 75, NA; C ode to Robinson, 28 October 1909, B ox 106GC, E D ,,
RG 75. NA.
On siltation o f the reservoir see Rollin Ritter to W.H. Code, 22 June 1910, B o x 120, GC, ED, RG 75, NA;
H.F. Robinson to W.H. Code, 2 July 1910, B ox 120, GC, ID, RG 75, N A; W.H. Sanders, engineer, to W.H.
C ode, 3 October 1910, B ox 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 18
O ctober 191Q; 5 January 1911, GC, ID, RG 75, N A . The siltation o f the reservoir became a huge problem
in later years, but is out o f the scope o f this thesis and is covered in detail elsewhere, see T J Ferguson, “The
Impact o f Federal Policy on Zuni Land U se” in Seasons o f the Kachina: Proceedings o f the California
State, Hayward, Conference on the Western Pueblos, 1987-88, edited by Lowell John Bean (M enlo Park,
CA Ballena Press, 1989), 103; Thomas W essel, “Phantom Experiment Station; Government Agriculture on
the Zuni Indian Reservation,” Agricultural H istory 61(1987) 1-12; for the Hogback see Salter, asst,
engineer to J.J. Granville, engineer, 27 March 1912 (telegram), GC, ID, B ox 106, RG 75, NA; Hauke, 2nd.
asst. CIA to Granville, 27 March 1912 (telegram). B ox 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Granville to CIA, 28
March 1912 (telegram). B ox 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Hauke to Granville, 1 April 1912, B o x 106, GC, ID,
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than July, “and our work has suffered considerable damage in consequence.” He claimed
that July, 1914 was the wettest July New Mexico had ever seen.**®
Work on the Hogback ditch slogged away year after year, but it would never
reclaim the 35,000 acres that John Wesley Powell had hoped for, or even the 20,000
acres that R.S. Connell claimed. And the siltation o f the reservoir at Zuni rendered the
Blackrock Dam almost useless.
These two projects never lived up to the expectations of the Irrigation Division.
Lack of planning, Zuni and Navajo cultural obligations, and a capricious environment all
conspired to make unworkable the Indian Service’s agricultural utopia. As America
became more industrialized, the Indian Service was still entranced by the agrarian myth.
Indians, like the rest of America, could be made whole citizens by learning the value of
tilling one’s own soil. Richard Hofstadter once said that “the agrarian myth came to be
believed more widely and tenaciously as it became more fictitious.” This was indeed
true for the Indian Service.

As farmers’ status began to decrease in the American

economy and image, the Indian Service tried, in an almost backwards move, to create a
new class of farmers. The Indian Service believed in a vast fiction in the Southwest:
Indians were not capable of farming on their own, and it was the Indian Service, bom out
of an agrarian empire, that could make them realize the fhiits of civilization. Not only
did the Indian Service buy the myth, but it tried to indoctrinate Indians. In the end, the
reverse was true. Myths about docile Indians, misperceptions of the environment, and a

R G 75, NA; H.F. Robinson to CIA, 22 May 1912, B ox 106, GC, ID, RG 75, NA; Annual Reports o f the
C hief Engineer, 1912, p. 127, B ox 1, Series 654, ID, RG 75, NA.
40
“ H.F. Robinson to W M. Reed. Chief Engineer, 17 July 1914; 25 July 1914, B ox 104, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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blind faith in the power of agriculture to civilize the Navajos and Zunis dashed
waterworks projects on the Colorado Plateau

41

Richard Hofstadter, The Age o f Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (N ew York: Vintage B ooks, 1955), 30.
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Conclusion

Indians and the environment are frequently represented in the literature as
defeated entities. The histories of both often have predictable plot lines and endings:
before the white man came all was well; after contact both were crippled and eventually
defeated.

When Indians and the environment are written about together, they are

portrayed as innocent victims o f viiite cupidity, stupidity, and, often, malice.
Alternately, Indians are often thought o f as inextricable from nature. This is too simple a
tale.*
The Government did not always run rampant over nature or Indians, rendering
them both defenseless and defeated. On the contrary, history is far more complex than
that, and the Blackrock dam and the Hogback ditch demonstrate cases where the Indian
Service misunderstood both nature and Indians, with costly results. In these two cases,
the forces o f the natural world and the exigencies o f the Navajo and Zuni cultures kept
these projects from being successful. Resistance to the efforts of the Irrigation Division
did not come from either the environment or the Indians in a calculated fashion. Rather,
as the waterworks projects got under way the forces o f nature and the strength o f
centuries of accumulated cultural vigor kicked in and made work difficult, if not
impossible.

Again, the notion of agency comes into play.

Indians on the Colorado

Plateau exercised agency not so much as a contemplated response to changing
‘ William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” Journal o f American History
78(1992): 1347-1376; Cronon describes what I am talking about as a declensionist narrative, one in which
the “plot ultimately falls rather than rises,” and the outcom e is decidedly negative, 1357; for writing Indian
environmental history see Richard White, “Indian Peoples and the Natural World: Asking the Right
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conditions, but merely as all people do; they carried on with day to day activities that
provide the structure for history and social change. W.H. Code summed up very nicely
this idea when he realized that “their dances offer charms at all times not found in the
monotonous round of daily toil.” In this case, Zuni agency merely meant that they chose
to dance, when they could have chosen to do otherwise. Carrying on with the prescribed
ritual cycle of the year was not only charming, it was essential. And Code was right:
working on a dam could not be nearly as satisfying, meaningful or, indeed, as fun as
dancing. Thus, the Zuni choice to dance and not work was a utilization o f their agency,
but it fit into the structure of everyday life. The environment, too, merely carried on as it
always had. It was only when the Indian Service attempted to alter previous ways of
knowing nature that a clash occurred and we see Indian and environmental agency as
resistance.^
It might be tempting to look for calculated responses of resistance to the Indian
Service’s efforts. And if the search revealed a concerted effort to resist, then more
research would be necessary to explore the motivations and shape of that response. For
the time being, however, carrying on with the annual cycle that had developed separately
from Indian Service efforts was the only evident response.

The character of the

responses, both from nature and from the Zunis and Navajos, to the Indian Service’s
reclamation efforts has shaped this thesis.

Questions,'’ in Rethinking American Indian History, Donald Fixico, ed. {Albuquerque: Univ. o f N ew
M exico Press, 1997), 87-100.
^ W.H. Code to the Secretary o f the Interior, 12 December 1905, B o x 212, SC 190, RG 75, NA.
There is evidence that could be fleshed out with further research that might support the hypothesis that the
Zuni did resist in a more calculated manner. Over the years o f Matilda C oxe Stevenson’s ethnological
research, 1880-1915, she noticed that rituals got longer and cam e more frequently; she also reported new
rituals. There is no sure way o f knowing whether this is related to the dam building, but the coincidence in
timing is suggestive. On agency, see note 14 in the introduction.
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Reluctance to embrace wage labor over domestic, subsistence labor is common
phenomena among precapitalist peoples. Michael Taussig describes this phenomena as a
clash between use-value and exchange-value modes o f production. Making money as a
worker on a dam and then being able to spend it on “things"—exchange value—holds far
less meaning than' planting com to eat and honor as the stuff of life—use-value.
Adherence to traditional use-value production rather than leaping into the wage economy
always baffled the Indian Service. That is, why would Navajos continue to repair a small
dam year after year when they returned from the mountains with their sheep when it was
time to plant, if they could have a permanent dam that would supply water year round?
John B. Harper was vexed perpetually by the Zuni when they would abandon work each
winter to participate in Shalako. If the dam was built, adherence to ritual would no
longer be necessary. The dam would replace ritual as the ordering agent in Zuni life.
Rather than praying to the gods, one only had to keep the spillway clean. But agents and
water planners who had been in the country only a short time could not expect simply to
reshape forces that had been ordering life for centuries, or longer.^
More than simple reluctance to engage in a wage economy that was circling
around them like a flock of vultures, waiting for the old ways to wither away, was the
Zuni and Navajos immersion in a mode of production that did not embrace
overproduction. Their economic orientation was not for the market; it was for use-value,
not exchange-value. To be sure, by the 1890s the Navajo sold wool and blankets in
exchange for cash; and some Navajos and Zuni left the reservation for wage work. But
reorienting agriculture to produce for a market and abandon ritual in favor of ordered

Michael Taussig, The D evil and Commodity Fetishism in South Am erica (Chapel Hill; Univ. o f North
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water flow from a dam or ditch was another matter. The Indian Service was not able to
manage water in the way they intended, and thus was unable to manage Indian life."^
By the end o f the period in question, contemporaneous reaction indicates that the
Irrigation Division was doing more harm than good. They had wasted precious resources
and had little to show for it. Indians may or may not have learned the value of work in
the white world; that’s difficult to quantify. But it is certain that the reclamation efforts
of the Irrigation Division were a failure. In 1913, Matthew M. Murphy, a long time, but
disgruntled, employee o f the Indian Service, spoke his mind in a letter and memorandum
to Arizona Senator Heniy F. Ashurst. The target o f Murphy’s vitriol was the Irrigation
Division, in particular the Blackrock dam on the Zuni Reservation. After witnessing
years of destructive flooding continually washing out the project, and costs escalating
year after year while production went down, Murphy attacked this white elephant with
aplomb. His assault on the Indian Service strikes the reader as nothing short of apostasy.
He pulled out of his quiver a battery o f charges that in their perspicuity and candor reveal
a project that was doomed from the start. Murphy’s insights into the reasons for the
failure of the project reveal, for the contemporary environmental historian, issues that
plagued not only the Zuni project, but others in the Southwest. Murphy wanted to launch
a full investigation of the Irrigation Division, with himself at the helm. He was so sure
that he would expose their wasteful ways that if he did not, he would resign from the
Indian Service in "disgrace

Carolina Press, 1980), 18-22.
“* Marshall Sahlins, The D om estic M ode o f Production; The Structure o f Underproduction,” in Stoite Age
£co/wot/c5: (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972).
^ Matthew Murphy to Senator Henry F. Ashurst, 8 May 1913; 16 May 1913, B ox 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA.
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Murphy’s sympathies clearly fall on the side of the Indians. Murphy contends
that at the time the dam was authorized, the Zuni were prosperous and seemed to have a
command of the environment.

Why, then, did a dam seem imperative? The Indian

Service, of course, did not ask them if they wanted the dam and Murphy avers that the
Zuni never displayed a shred o f interest in the project. Additionally, Murphy touches
upon the flooding that wreaked havoc on the dam. He wondered; Why, if the dam was
supposed to hold back floodwaters from spring run-off and summer downpours, the only
type of water that normally flowed th ro u ^ the streambed, did the engineers building the
dam not have an adequate understanding of the power of Southwestern freshets?
According to Murphy, and I think that the record bears out his claim, the Indian Service
began work on the dam really having no idea what they were up against.

That

floodwaters were to fill the reservoir behind the dam did not alert them to the possibility
that those same waters might be destructive, not productive. After a systematic reading
of the Annual Reports of the Commissioner o f Indian Affairs, Murphy contended that in
direct relation to worsening conditions at Zuni—continued flooding, siltation, and Indian
disinterest—the Commissioner’s discussion o f the project went down. It appeared that
the Zuni dam was becoming an embarrassment. When the project was going well, the
Annual Reports had lengthy, glowing, detailed descriptions of the success of the dam; as
costs escalated, with little land under cultivation, the reports on the dam became virtual
footnotes.
To Murphy, the Blackrock dam was a colossal waste o f money. It was a project
that the Indians did not want and did not need. While Murphy’s comments may be those
of a disenchanted government employee, they do have value. With very little hindsight.
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he picked up on several o f the large themes that I have addressed. Most importantly, he
understood the related issues surrounding the Indian Service’s refusal to consult the
Zunis which, in turn, ignored centuries of captured information regarding wresting a
living from the Colorado Plateau and led the Irrigation Division to attempt a project in an
environment that they barely understood. Too, Murphy grasped that the Blackrock dam,
year after year, took precedence over other projects and was the bulk of the Irrigation
Division’s budget which meant that the Irrigation Division shunted aside other projects.
Murphy seemed to think that, as do I, that the Irrigation Division’s fatal mistake was its
arrogant ignorance o f Indians and the environment.^
But, of course, Murphy’s criticism did not go unanswered.

W.M, Reed,

superintendent o f irrigation, responded with equal vigor to Murphy’s critique.

His

arguments were sound, too. He claimed that conditions in the Southwest were changing
so rapidly—increases in population, prime grazing lands falling into private hands—that
the Indian Service was honor-bound to see to it that the Navajos and Zunis had adequate
land from which to make a living. Indians did not realize that conditions were fast
changing and that their lifeways would soon be obsolete.

“Left alone, unaided and

uninstructed he would not have foreseen the approach o f such conditions and would have
realized them only when he found himself facing starvation.” Indian Service prescience
would save the Navajos and Zunis. ^

U b id
^ W .M. Reed, “Memorandum on Matthew Murphy’s discourse on Commissioner’s and others’
mismanagement o f Zuni Indian aflfairs,” 26 April 1913, B ox 120, GC, ID, RG 75, NA. That Reed’s memo is
dated several weeks before Murphy’s letter is not a discrepancy. Murphy’s report on the dam was written
before Reed s response; I am simply using a copy o f his report attached to his letter to Ashurst, which was
sent after Reed’s response.
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Indeed, conditions were changing and few o f the new settlers in the Southwest
had much concern for the fate of the Indians, especially Navajos wandering about with
their flocks. Reed was right, to a point, in saying that the Indian Service had the interests
of the Zunis and Navajos in mind, but he did not address the mistakes made on the dam.
He allowed that John Harper was too optimistic concerning how long it would take the
dam to be finished and how much it would cost. But he was disposed to put down the
failure o f the dam in 1909 to nature and not Irrigation Division mistakes.
Reed was reluctant to accede to any of Murphy’s criticisms. Had he done so he
would have been indicting the agency he oversaw. While Murphy’s report reveals some
of the broad contours o f the problem, Reed’s response highlights one crucial problem:
Irrigation Division refusal to see their own complicity in the failures of the dam.
Throughout the period, the Indian Service, and later the Irrigation Division specifically,
always found fault with the Indians or with the environment. Maybe this is not too
surprising. But when held up against Zuni and Navajo participation in this story, the
Indian Service comes off as having no say. Indeed, they position themselves in the story
as merely being at the whims of the Navajos, Zunis, and the environment. I originally set
out to show that the combined strength of the Zunis, Navajos, and nature guided
waterworks efforts on the Colorado Plateau between 1883 and 1914. 1 was confident that
this premise was a plausible one. It seems, however, that the engineers and bureaucrats
o f the Indian Service and Irrigation Division had done a far finer job of proving that
themselves.
The stoiy has no absolute closure; it is merely a part of a larger, more intricate
narrative. But by taking a magnifying glass to a discrete portion of Indian history in the
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Southwest, I hope to have fleshed out some of the complexity of Indian environmental
history.

Judging exactly what types of social change occurred among the Zuni and

Navajo demands a longer-term analysis and a different lens through which to view the
history. My modest goal has been to show that the Zuni and Navajo, and, of course, the
environment, played a very active role in determining what type of social change did
occur. The Indian Service was, to be sure, a vehicle for that change. But, and even often
by their own admission, they directed the history less than the supposedly passive vessels
o f their wisdom: the Navajos and Zunis, and the natural world o f the Southwest.
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